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INTRODUCTION 
The history of the Sanitary Improvement District (SID) in 
Nebraska is closely tied to the history of urban development in 
the Omaha Metropolitan Area. The end of World War II freed the 
pent-up demand for new dwelling units in Nebraska as well as in 
the rest of the nation. Omaha's stock of platted lots was rapidly 
used up in the late 40's and pressures were great for opening up 
new areas. To meet the demand, new dwellings began to spring up 
on the fringes of the City, but altogether too many of these were 
served only by wells and septic tanks. As the housing boom developed 
it became clear that such utilities could not satisfactorily accom-
modate large concentrations of suburban populations. Yet the City 
found it difficult to extend water, sewer and other utilities to 
the new areas, partly because many existing areas of the City were 
not provided with such services and political necessity demanded 
that these needs be met first. Consequently, neither the developers 
nor the City had the organizational capacities or the financial 
resources to urbanize these fringe areas properly. 
The Sanitary and Improvement District concept was originated 
to provide capital to developers through tax-exempt government 
financing devices (warrants and bonds) so developers could install 
standard-quality improvements in their developments. Al-though the 
SID has been referred to as a "corporate political body," legally 
it is a public corporation which operates to install and maintain 
such improvements as parks, sewers, sidewalks, streets, and utilities. 
The SID has the authority to levy and collect general real estate 
taxes and special assessments to pay for its operations. 
Enabling legislation for Sanitary and Improvement Districts 
was passed in 1947, but the general use and acceptance of the SID 
mechanism did not take place until the early 1950's (after a second 
SID Act was passed in 1949). As the SID mechanism gained acceptance 
it became a powerful tool for land development. In Douglas County 
approximately 30 SID's were created before 1958 (official records 
begin with SID 31 which was established in 1958). Over the 1958-
1959 period, 16 more SID's were established. The boom in SID's 
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became more apparent in the 1960's. A total of 114 SID's were 
created during the 1960-1965 period and 60 more were created from 
1966-1970. Over the 1971-1974 period, another 58 SID's were estab-
lished. Similarly, the explosion of SID's became apparent in Sarpy 
County during the 1960's. 
Public Concern Over the SID Process 
At the writing of this report (May, 1975) the SID concept has 
been in operation for more than a quarter century. Throughout this 
life span, however, the SID has been the subject of criticism and 
public concern which have led to numerous amendments to the SID law 
since 1949. 
Although the initial amendments to the SID legislation were 
largely to expand the role of the SID, public concern over the SID 
process was evident in the early 1950's. The primary concern then 
was that developers using the SID were continuing to install minimal 
or substandard improvements. 
demands by the City of Omaha 
These concerns led to more rigorous 
that SID's within its three-mile extra-
territorial jurisdiction adhere to minimum improvement standards. 
Criticism of the SID became sharper in the 1960's, centering 
on allegations that SID expenditures were excessive, assessments 
and mill levies inadequate, and debts upon annexation too large. 
Some of these concerns were being expressed in the mass media. In 
1966 Rene Beauchesne, a Creighton University political scientist 
writing in the Omaha World Herald, reported that between 1958 and 
1966 the City of Omaha had assumed more than $4.6 million in debts 
upon annexation of SID's. Professor Beauchesne stated: "These 
figures indicate that a system which permits the unregulated and 
irresponsible accumulation of substantial debt is in need of some 
kind of regulation. The fact that all of this debt is perfectly 
legal simply shows the need for change in the law." And the law 
was changed. In fact, it was amended in 1967, 1969, 1971, 1972, 
1973, and 1974. For the most part these amendments served to 
clarify the role of the SID and to provide for the regulation of 
the SID process. 
Purposes of the Study 
In 1974 the Miscellaneous Subjects Committee of the Nebraska 
State Legislature held hearings on SID's to establish a basis for 
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subsequent legislation. The present repor·t was commissioned by 
the Nebraska Legislature to look further into the complicated 
subject of SID's. This report deals with three broad SID topics. 
These are: (1) the SID development process, {2) the fiscal structure 
of SID's, and (3) participants in the SID process. 
The first Chapter, on the SID development process, is descrip-
tive in nature. It seeks to explain how the SID mechanism works. 
Included in this Chapter are discussions of the SID law and amend-
ments thereto, the SID process, the composition of SID boards of 
trustees, and alternative approaches to the urban development 
process. 
The second Chapter analyzes the !iscal structure and operations 
of SID's and attempts to evaluate the financial impact of SID's. 
Included in this Chapter are comparisons of the assessed value and 
debt of annexed and unannexed SID's in Douglas and Sarpy Counties 
and of SID and non-SID developments. Also included are discussions 
of expenditures by length of SID life and the financing costs of 
SID's. 
The third Chapter is devoted to a discussion of the views of 
constituent groups in the SID process. Attention is focused on the 
views of developers, construction firms, representatives of bond 
houses, attorneys, City officials, and resident board of trustee 
members. Specifically, their views on the advantages, disadvantages, 
and abuses of the SID mechanism and suggested changes in the SID 
law are presented. 
Recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of the SID 
mechanism are presented in the fourth Chapter of this report. 
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Chapter I 
SID'S AND THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Nebraska's Sanitary and Improvement District (SID) is only one 
of several mechanisms available both in Nebraska and elsewhere 
throughout the nation for carrying out urban development. 'rhis 
Chapter deals with the nature of the SID mechanism and some of the 
more significant alternative mechanisms, and dttempts to evalua·te 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. 
The SID Law 
The 1947 Act. In 1947 the Nebraska State Legislature sought to 
aid the installation of water, sanitation and drainage improvements 
in built-up areas outside of incorporated cities by passing the first 
of two Sanitary and Improvement District Acts. This 1947 Act provides 
that ten percent of the legal voters resident in a proposed sanitary 
and improvement district (which has to be outside the boundaries of a 
municipality) can petition their county board to hold a referendum 
among all the voters of the proposed district. If a simple majority 
of ·those casting ballots vote to form an SID, it shall be deemed 
established. The voters of the new District then choose a five-person 
board of trustees from among resident taxpayers. The SID Board is 
granted the power to establish, maintain and construct water mains, 
sewers and disposal plants and to dispose of drainage, waste and 
sewage in a satisfactory manner. To pay for these improvements the 
SID Board is given the power to levy taxes, to issue warrants 
(essentially IOU's) for work done, and to float bonds to cover 
these warrants. 
The 1947 Act provides for the construction of water, sanitary 
and drainage improvements only in already developed urban residential 
areas outside existing municipalities. It does not allow for the 
construction of streets and gas and electric lines, nor does it aid 
the development of new tracts. It is also restricted from aiding 
any industrial tract of twenty acres or more. 
Developers wanted something more to permit the urbani za·tion 
of raw land, and in 1949 the Legislature responded by passing a 
second Sanitary and Improvement District Act. 
I 
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The 1949 Act as Amended. Like the previous Act, the 1949 Act 
authorizes the Sanitary and Improvement District to undertake certain 
specified public works and to levy and to collect taxes to pay for 
these works. It may perform many more functions (31-727)!/, however, 
and these include authority 
- to install: 
(l) electric service lines and conduits, 
(2) a sewer system, 
(3) a water system, 
(4) a system of sidewalks, public roads, street and 
highways, public waterways, docks or wharfs; 
- to contract for: 
(5) water for fire protection and for resale to residents 
of the SID, 
(6) gas and electricity for street lighting; 
- to construct and to contract for the construction of: 
(7) dikes and levees for flood protection; 
- to acquire, improve and operate: 
(8) public parks, playgrounds and recreational facilities. 
In addition, SID's formed under the 1949 Act are given specific 
status as public corporations (the 1947 Act is silent on this point) 
are established through action by the district court rather than 
the county board, and the court decree creat.ing the SID must be filed 
in the Office of the Secretary of State in the same manner as 
articles of incorporation are required to be filed under the general 
law concerning corporations. 
SID's under the 1949 Act as amended are formed to urbanize 
rural, agricultural land. Thus, a majority of owners having an 
interest in the real property within the limits of a proposed SID 
may make and sign articles of association, and may petition the 
district court to establish the SID as a public corporation (31-727). 
The articles of incorporation shall propose the names of five or 
more trustees, who shall be owners of real estate located in the 
proposed SID, and shall state: 
(a) the name of the proposed SID, 
(b) that same shall have perpetual existence, 
1/The numbers in parentheses refer to the sect.ion in 'che Reissue 
Revised Nebraska Statutes. 
1 
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(c) the limits of the SID, 
(d) the names and places of residence of the owners of the 
land in the proposed SID, 
(e) the description tracts in the proposed SID owned by the 
organizers, 
(f) the names of owners, and description of their property, 
who do not join in organizing the district but who will 
be benefited by it, 
(g) the purpose of the SID (drawn from the above list of 
authorities), and 
(h) that the owners forming the district obligate themselves 
to pay all general taxes and special assessments levied 
against their properties, and to pay the expenses 
necessary to carry out the purposes of the SID. 
The district court in the county in which the SID is located 
considers the articles of association and hears objections (31-729) 
to the formation of the SID. Any or all SID landowners not signing 
the articles may object to the formation of the SID itself or to the 
inclusion of their land within it. Barring outright denial of 
formation the district court (31-730) then issues a decree declaring 
the SID a public corporation of the State and the five trustees 
previously nominated as the trustees of the SID. 
The court may exclude such real estate as will not be benefited 
from inclusion within the limits of the SID. No lands within any 
municipal corporation shall be included, and no tract of 20 acres 
or more which is primarily for industrial purposes shall be included 
without the written consent of the owner. 
Duties of the SID Boards of Trustees include electing a chairman 
within 30 days, adopting a seal, recording all proceedings and making 
them available to landowners, and employing an engineer, attorney 
and clerical help (31-733). 
Each trustee must post a personal performance bond of $500 
(31-734). 
An election for all trustees must be held within the first 12 
months of an SID's formation, and elections must be held every two 
years thereafter (31-735). At the election held six years after the 
first election, and at every subsequent election, two members of the 
board of trustees are to be elected by the legal property owners 
resident in the SID (31-735). Ample written notice of the election 
must be given to each landowner in the SID. Votes count one for each 
acre of unplatted land owned and one for each platted lot owned. 
For its corporate purposes the district has the power to pur-
r 
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chase or acquire through eminent domain real or personal property 
within or without its corporate limits (31-736 and 31-737). The 
district also possesses the power of eminent domain to acquire 
rights-of-way across public lands (31-738). 
The SID has the power to borrow money for corporate purposes 
by issuing general obligation bonds (31-739). It must levy a tax on 
the assessed value of all taxable property in the district sufficient 
to pay the interest and principal on the bonds and to create a sink-
ing fund for maintenance and repair. 
The ~ID must levy special assessments on all parcels in the 
district which are benefited by the improvements (31-751), except for 
properties which by law are not assessable. Where such exempt prop-
erty is specially benefited the owner shall pay the district a 
sum equivalent to the amount the property has been specially bene-
fited. 
The SID can issue bonds to cover the costs of improvements after 
these have been completed and accepted (31-755). All bonds must 
mature within 30 years and the first series must mature not later 
than five years from the date of issue. 
To make partial payments as the work progresses, SID's may issue 
warrants to cover not more than 85 percent of the cost of the work 
completed (31-755). The board of trustees is to fix the rate of 
interest on warrants which are to be redeemed from the proceeds of 
special assessments or from the sale of bonds. 
The SID must have its books audited by 30 June of each year 
(31-740). The audit is to be filed with the Auditor of Public 
Accounts by 31 December of each year. 
When a municipality annexes an SID the SID ceases to exist and 
the municipality succeeds to all the property and property rights, 
contracts, obligations and assets of the SID (31-763). 
The SID Development Process 
Although the 1949 SID law as amended spells out in great detail 
the legal procedures SID's must observe, it gives few clues as to how 
the SID development process actually operates in practice. This 
section describes the essential features of that process as it occurs 
in Douglas County and relative to the City of Omaha. The SID process 
in other parts of Nebraska would be similar but might well differ 
with respect to details. 
3 
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The process begins when a developer acquires a tract of land 
or decides to develop a tract which he may have owned for a number 
of years. The term "developer" as used in this section will usually 
refer to an individual, although it can and often does refer to 
a group of associates or ·to a company. Upon deciding to undertake 
development, the developer does three things immediately: 
1. He initiates a petition to the district court to establish 
an SID for his tract. The SID is used as a development 
vehicle only; by law it cannot be ur;cd to purchase the 
development tract. 
2. He engages an engineer to design his development: plan the 
layout of streets, plat the building lots, locate drainage 
ways, school and park sites, etc. 
3. He approaches a bond house for the purpose of negotiating 21 
an agreement with it to market the SID's warrants and bonds.-
The developer's next step in the process is to request a pre-
application conference with ·the Omaha City Planning Department, if 
his development is within the City's three-mile extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, or with the Douglas County Planning Commission, if his 
development is outside the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the City 
of Omaha. At this conference the developer and his engineer present 
in sketch form their ideas and intentions with respect to the design 
of the development, and obtain the reactions and suggestions of the 
City or County Planning officials.}/ 
The developer's engineer then proceeds to draw up ~he preliminary 
plat of the development, incorporating the suggestions of the planning 
officials. He also estimates the cost of all improvements and pre-
pares a schedule of those which should be financed by means of special 
assessments against the platted lots within the development. (The 
remaining development costs, then, are to be paid out of revenues from 
the SID's general tax levy either directly or through general obliga-
~/"warrants" are short-term interest-bearing notes to provide 
interim financing for the SID's activities- I.O.U.'s., in effect. 
"Bonds" are long-term obligations for financing the SID's capital 
expenditures. 
1/The preapplication conference, preliminary plat, final plat 
procedures described briefly herein are set forth in detail in the 
City's and County's subdivision regulations. 
I 
1 
I! 
I' 
I 
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tion bonds which will be paid off out of those revenues.) 
When the engineer has completed drawing up the preliminary 
plat of the development the developer returns to the City or County 
seeking approval of his preliminary plat. It is at this stage that 
crucial decisions on streets, sewers, parks and other improvements 
to be constructed in the development are made. In the City of Omaha, 
the preliminary plat and other matters related to the development 
and the SID are reviewed by a cabinet-level committee composed of 
the Directors of the Planning, Finance, Public Works, Parks and Rec-
reation, Housing and Urban Development and Legal Departments. This 
committee, established by Mayor Zorinsky shortly after he came into 
office, has done a great deal to improve the quality of City reviews 
and to eliminate conflicting requirements imposed on developers by 
the various City departments. 
The City or County has the power to approve or disapprove the 
preliminary plat; if it disapproves, the developer must modify his 
preliminary plat to remove the objectionable features before he can 
move ahead. The City's or County's approval of the developer's 
preliminary plat assures him approval of his final plat, provided 
all improvements are installed in accordance with the approved pre-
liminary plat and the City's or County's engineering standards. If 
the development is located within the City's extra-territorial juris-
diction the schedule of special assessments must be submitted to 
the City for its review, and it is usually submitted with the 
preliminary plat. However, the City does not have the power of 
approval or disapproval of the special assessments schedule; if it 
has objections to that schedule it can only file those objections 
with the SID or appeal to the Courts. 
Usually, by the time the developer secures approval of his 
preliminary plat the district court has granted the decree estab-
lishing the developer's SID. The first actions of the SID board 
of trustees are to (a) organize itself by electing a chairman 
(which is usually the developer) and other officers, (b) employ an 
engineer and attorney (which are usually the developer's engineer 
and attorney), (c) employ a clerk, who shall be paid a salary of 
$600.00 annually (and who may also be a member of the board of 
trustees). In addition, as soon as possible after its creation the 
board of trustees establishes a mill levy to provide funds to cover 
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its operating expenses. Initially, this mill levy brings in very 
little money, even though the practice in recent years has been to 
set it as high as 15 to 20 mills, because the as yet undeveloped 
land in the SID is assessed as rural, agricultural land. 
With approval of his preliminary plat and the granting of the 
court decree establishing his SID, the developer can then complete 
the agreement with the bond house for marketing the SID's warrants 
and bonds. This agreement is made in the name of the SID, rather 
than in the name of the developer.±! Both developers and bond 
houses prefer to have this type of financial arrangement right from 
the beginning. It assures the developer of his financing and 
facilitates the bond house's marketing of the SID's warrants. 
The bond house, before entering into such an agreemen·t with a 
developer, conducts a thorough investigation both of the developer's 
financial status and of the development's probable success. Based 
on the development's estimated development costs and the bond 
house's prognosis of probable future trends in the housing market, 
the bond house makes a judgment as to whether or not the proposal 
has a reasonable prospect of reaching full development, what the 
general obligation debt to assessed valuation (GO/AV) ratio is 
likely to be, and what mill levy will likely be needed to pay off 
the general obligation debt. If the GO/AV ratio is more than 1:5 
(GO debt 20 percent of AV) , bond houses at the present time feel 
they would have a difficult time marketing the SID's bonds. Currently, 
the City of Omaha also uses the 1:5 GO/AV ratio as one element in 
judging the suitability of SID's for annexation.~/ 
With consummation of the warrant and bond marketing agreement 
between the SID and the bond house, the SID is ready to advertise 
for bids and go to contract for the actual construction of improve-
ments in the development as proposed in the preliminary plat. These 
!/At this point the shift of the leadership role from developer 
to SID should be noted. Although the developer is almost always 
chairman of the SID Board of Trustees and, because he owns most of 
the property within the SID, has the controlling voice in the affairs 
of the SID, the developer qua developer begins to fade into the back-
ground and the SID Board of Trustees begins to assume primary 
responsibility for and direction of development activities. 
~/See the sections in Chapter III summarizing the interviews 
of bond house representatives and Omaha City officials. 
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contracts are based on the plans and specifications prepared by the 
developer's engineer (now the SID's engineer), and are authorized 
by a "resolution of necessity" adopted by the board of trustees at 
a duly advertised public meeting. This same resolution of necessity 
enables the developer to proceed with filing for approval of his 
final plat with the Omaha ~ity Planning Department or the Douglas 
County Planning Commission. Approval of the developer's final plat, 
and its recording in the County Clerk's Office, opens the way for 
him to start marketing his lots (and building his houses if he is 
both a developer and a builder). The developer may file for final 
plat approval of only a section of his development at a time, depend-
ing on conditions in the housing market. The SID, then, schedules 
its construction of improvements accordingly. 
The construction contracts usually provide for monthly payments 
on the basis of the contractor's estimate of work completed. This 
estimate is checked by the SID's engineer and, provided he agrees 
with the contractor's estimate of work completed, the SID board of 
trustees at a public meeting authorizes the issuance of warrants 
for payment of 85 percent of the value of the completed work. The 
remaining 15 percent of the payment is withheld as a performance 
surety, to be paid the contractor when all work is completed satis-
factorily. 
The procedure whereby the contractor actually gets his money 
becomes rather involved. The SID at this stage has little or no tax 
revenues or other capital with which to pay the contractor. Con-
sequently, the contractor's bills must be converted into marketable 
instruments--warrants--which can be sold to raise the money to pay 
the contractor. The role of the bond house becomes crucial in 
accomplishing this. Also, a new actor enters the process at this 
point: the bond counsel. The bond counsel is retained by the bond 
house to pass on the legality of bond issues and related matters 
such as the marketing of warrants. The process is approximately as 
follows: 
1. The SID's attorney (who usually is also the developer's 
attorney and may even be a member of the SID's board of 
trustees) prepares the warrants and the minutes of the 
board's meeting at which it authorized the issuance of 
the warrants, and sends these to the bond house. 
2. The bond house registers the warrants with the County 
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Treasurer, who is designated by law as the fiscal officer 
for all SID's in the County, 
3. The bond house then sends the registered warrants to the 
contractor for endorsement. 
4. At the same time the bond house sends a copy of the board 
of trustees' minutes and rela·ted information on the 
warrants to the bond counsel for his review, 
5. When the bond house receives back the endorsed warran·ts 
from the contractor, and the approva '· of the bond counsel, 
the bond house can proceed to market the warrant.s. Usually, 
but not always, the bond house has purchasers ready and 
waiting to buy the warrants as soon as the bond house gets 
the green light from the bond counsel. 
6. Upon selling the warrants, the bond house uses the proceeds 
to pay off the contractor. 
The whole procedure, according to one bond house representative, 
takes from seven ·to ten days. However, seven of the nine con·tractors 
interviewed by CAUR cited problems-·- primarily delays-- in converting 
SID warrants into working capital as a major disadvantage to them of 
the SID development mechanism. 
At the present time the bond houses charge SID's a fee of from 
three to four percent of the face value of the warrants for their 
services in registering and marketing the warrants. 
The SID as it proceeds with the construction of improvements 
accumulates I.O.U.'s. in the form of warrants. The bond house 
watches this process carefully, and at what it 
time--depending on the amoun·t of warrant 
judges to be the 
debt accumulated, proper 
growth of assessed value in the SID, conditions in the housing 
market, and prevailing interest rates in the bond market--it advises 
the SID that it should float a bond issue to pay off the accumulated 
warrant debt. If the development is large and is being developed in 
several stages, the SID may float several bond issues over its life-
time. 
The bond house advises the SID not only on when to go to a 
bond issue but also on what the total amount of the bond issue 
should be, what the repayment schedule should be, and--based on 
projections of future assessed values in the development--at what 
rate the mill levy should be set to provide the revenue necessary to 
meet the repayment schedule. Again, as with the marketing of warrants, 
each bond issue is reviewed and approved by the bond counsel before 
I, 
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the bond house proceeds with marketing it. 
At present bond house fees for marketing SID bond issues are 
running about 7~ percent of the face value of the issue. This fee 
can either be added to the cost of the bond (making the cost of a 
$1,000 bond $1,075 to the purchaser for example), or can be added 
to the bond as a supplementary interest-bearing "B" coupon. Accord-
ing to the bond houses, the preferences of the bond purchasers 
determine which alternative is used. The City of Omaha, however, 
has instituted court action contesting the legality of the "B" 
coupon alternative. 
These, then, are the essential aspects of the SID development 
process. Any additional activities are more or less a repeat of 
one or more of the actions described. When all of the development 
decisions with respect to street improvements, sewer and water lines, 
school and park sites, etc. have been made (usually within approxi-
mately five years from the development's start) and home owners have 
begun to move into the development in significant numbers, the 
developer is content to have the city annex the SID or to turn its 
operation over to the home owners. 
In the past 15 years particularly the SID mechanism has become 
the preeminent mode of suburban development in Douglas and Sarpy 
Counties. There are, however, other alternative mechanisms permitted 
by Nebraska State law for carrying out such development. These are 
explored in the next section. 
SID Boards of Trustees and Principal Developers 
Active SID's in Douglas County were analyzed to determine: 
(1) the extent to which board of trustee members were residents of 
their respective SID's, (2) board members who were also listed as 
principal developers, (3) which boards were controlled by residents 
and which by principal developers, and (4) how many individuals 
were on more than one board. The analysis included 108 active 
SID's identified by SID audit reports for 1973 and by the Omaha-
Council Bluffs Metropolitan Area Planning Agency (MAPA) as being 
in Douglas County. 
The basic lists of SID board of trustee members and principal 
developers, supplied by the Legislature's Miscellaneous Subjects 
Committee, had been derived from SID audits for the year 1973. 
These lists were up-dated and supplemented by information of the 
1 
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Douglas County Clerk's records to obtain current and complete 
coverage of board members and principal developers for these 108 
SID's.~/ 
Residents and Principal Developers on SID Boards of Trustees. 
A total of 548 board members were identified in the 108 SID's. Of 
these, addresses could be traced for 538. About 145, or 27 percent, 
of these 538 board members were residents of their respective SID's. 
Only 28 of the 108 SID's, or 26 percent, had three or more residents 
on the board of trustees and, thus, could be said to be dominated 
by residents. In five of these SID's, however, three or more of 
the resident board of trustee members were also listed as principal 
developers. 
At least 50 percent of all board members were principal devel-
opers. This, however, is a conservative figure because it does not 
include employees of the principal developers who are listed as 
board members, but are not listed as principal developers. Several 
instances can be documented where clerks, cashiers, office secre-
taries, business managers, and other employees of the principal 
developer serve on the board, but are not listed as principal 
developers. 
Seventy-one of the 108 boards, or almost 66 percent, were 
dominated by principal developers. Information 
developer was missing for two of the 108 SID's. 
on the principal 
The boards of the 
~/It should be noted that in many cases the County Clerk's 
records were incomplete and fragmented. The only way to ascertain 
a current board listing for active SID's via the County Clerk's 
records was to peruse the trustee personal bond filings. In doing 
th1s, several problems were encountered: (1) Terminology--bonds 
were specified in terms anywhere from a two-year period as provided 
for by statute, to bonds which established a term from the date 
establishing the SID "indefinitely." (2) Staggered terms--some 
boards consisted of staggered terms with terms running, for example, 
from 1965-1966, 1965-1967, and 1964-1966. (3) More than five 
trustees--no more than five trustees are permitted by statute. 
While this statutory limit is probably adhered to, some boards had 
more than five individuals represented by bonds, unaccompanied by 
documents establishing who replaces who in the process of resignation, 
re-election, or appointment. (4) Time lags--in a few cases, current 
bonds are not on file for active SID's. In such cases, the bonds on 
file were generally for the original trustees at the time the SID 
was formed. For example, in one case, a still-existing SID had only 
1965 bonds. 
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remaining nine SID's, including the two with no information on 
the principal developer, were comprised either of residents whose 
addresses could not be traced or associates of the principal devel-
oper who were not listed as principal developers. New SID's, as 
might be expected, tended to be developer-dominated while most of 
the SID's where the boards were controlled by residents had been 
in existence for periods ranging from eight years .to 15 years, with 
the exception of one which was four years old. 
The Concentration of SID Board Members!1~ps. The Douglas County 
Clerk's records list 548 board of trustee members. 
than the 540 board memberships permitted by law for 
This is eight more 
108 SID's. These 
548 board memberships were held by 434 persons. Three hundred sixty-
five of these 434 persons were on only one SID board, while 69 were 
on two or more SID boards. These 69 persons, comprising approximately 
16 percent of the total number of persons holding board memberships, 
held 173, or 33 percent, of the total number of memberships. Several 
of those on more than one board were attorneys who, in most instances, 
represent the developer. One person held a total of 13 board member-
ships. More detailed data is given in Table 1. 
A good portion of the board members were related. Twenty-six 
percent, or 140, of the 548 members were obviously related (i.e., 
had the same last name and same address or same last name and same 
SID). Relatives with different last names (e.g., in-laws) could 
not be identified and so were not counted. This implies that the 
actual control of the SID's is probably in the hands of fewer 
persons than the total of 548 would suggest. 
Of the 108 SID's in this analysis, only 24 had SID boards with 
no members on other boards and no obviously related individuals. 
Of these, only 18 percent of the members were principal developers 
(four of the 24 SID's had three or more principal developers on 
the board of trustees) while 62 percent were residents of the SID 
area. This is in contrast to the 50 percent rate for principal 
developers and the 27 percent rate for board members residing in 
their respective SID's as reported in earlier paragraphs. 
Alternatives to SID's 
Two major interdependent virtues of SID's were praised by SID 
proponents in CAUR's interviews. They saw the SID concept as a 
method for ensuring that new developments are constructed with 
re 
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TABLE 1 
CONCENTRATION OF SID BOARD .MEMBERSHIPS 
Board Memberships Number of Percent Board 
a/ Percent Held by One Person Persons of Total Memberships-- of Total 
1 365 84.1 365 66.6 
2 48 11.0 96 17.5 
3 12 2.8 36 6.6 
4 4 0.9 16 2.9 
5 2 0.5 10 1.8 
6 2 0.5 12 2.2 
13 1 0.2 13 2.4 
434 100.0 54#1 100.0 
a/ 
-Board memberships held by one person times number of persons. 
b/ 
-The law specifies that each SID Board of Trustees shall have five members. 
Therefore, 108 boards should have 540 memberships. However, the County Clerk's 
records list more than five members for some boards. 
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improvements (i.e., streets, sewers, water lines, recreational 
facilities, etc.) of high quality geared to the needs of the future. 
Further, the SID's were seen as governmental entities which permit 
the financing of these improvements through tax-free warrants and 
bonds, enabling the developer to install quality improvements beyond 
the immediate needs of his development. Without SID's, CAUR was 
told, the quality of improvements in new developments would tend 
toward the minimum because developers would try to minimize their 
costs to avoid pricing their developments out of the market. They 
contended in addition that without SID's, there would be fewer 
developers, and that this restriction of competition would contribute 
to lower quality improvements and higher lot costs to home buyers. 
The SID concept, 
of 
therefore, can be viewed as one approach to 
(a) who decides what improvements are to be the twin questions 
installed, and (b) who decides how such improvements are to be 
financed. If each of these questions is dichotomized (even though 
it is recognized that a continuum reflects the actual range of 
alternatives more accurately), four types of development concepts 
result as illustrated: 
TYPES OF DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS 
Type of Decisions About Financing of 
Development concept Improvements Are: Improvements Is: 
I Private Private 
II Private Public 
III Public Public 
IV Public Private 
In the immediate post-World War II period development in the 
Omaha Area. followed the Type I concept: decisions as to what 
improvements were to be installed were strictly private and such 
improvements as were installed were privately financed. The results 
were as portrayed by SID proponents in CAUR's interviews. Improve-
ments installed in new developments were minimal or non-existent, 
with the consequence that when adequate improvements were 
later--usually by the City of Omaha after annexation--the 
installed 
costs were 
e 
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much higher than they would have been if they had been installed 
before the homes were built.21 The SID concept, which allowed for 
the installation of improvements before home construction, represented 
a very real cost saving over the former Type I development approach. 
Use of the Type I development concept, prevalent before World 
War II, has been virtually eliminated since then as the need for 
adequate regulation of land subdiv~sion in the public interest has 
become increasingly recognized. 
The SID concept as it appears to have operated in its early 
stages conformed very closely to the Type II development concept: 
private decisions (with limited public controls at most) on what 
improvements are to be installed with the use of public financing. 
However, from what CAUR has been able to learn of actual practice 
in the early 1950's, utilization of the SID mechanism did not auto-
matically lead to the installation of standard-quality improvements 
in new developments. This happened only when the City of Omaha 
moved to require, through its subdivision control authority within 
its three-mileextra-territorialzoning jurisdiction, minimum adequate 
improvements in new developments. Existence of the SID's public 
financing mechanism greatly facilitated provision of the required 
improvements, but did not by itself bring about their provision. 
Developers soon learned, in fact, that the SID mechanism per-
mitted them to transfer much of the cost of sometimes very plush 
improvements such as private clubs to the public financing mechanism 
provided by the SID. Eventually the City of Omaha became concerned 
over the amount of general obligation debt it was assuming when it 
annexed such SID's, and began to seek additional authority from the 
State Legislature to control SID decisions. The result is that the 
current SID approach retains public financing but has substituted 
substantially greater public control over improvement decisions. 
Thus, the current SID approach diverges somewhat from the Type II 
model. 
The Type III development concept shifts decisions on what 
improvements are to be installed to the public authority while 
retaining the public financing of improvements. The Lincoln Area. 
1/omaha City Planning Department, A Century of Progress Through 
Annexation, Report 176 (undated). 
1r 
-16-
operates under this concept almost entirely, and only recently has 
made use of the SID, or Type II, approach even though the SID law 
applies to the Lincoln area the same as it does to the Omaha Area. 
Lincoln typically annexes the area to be developed (usually not 
more than 80 acres at a time), installs the improvements, and either 
pays for the costs out of general revenues or imposes special assess-
ments on the property owner who then has 20 years in which to pay 
off the assessment. While waiting to collect its special assessments, 
the City finances these improvements from a revolving fund created 
by floating "special assessment bonds" backed, however, by the City's 
general fund in case of default. Lincoln's aggressive policy of 
annexation before development enables the City to directly control 
what is done and to add to its tax base immediately. It also has 
discouraged non-contiguous development, which Lincoln can enforce 
effectively because it owns the public utilities that serve the 
area. 
Omaha may have been deterred from using the Type III approach 
by its interpretation of state laws and its own ordinances. Omaha 
claims it cannot annex land that is rural in character, that its 
special assessments have to be paid off in 10 years, and that the 
city cannot issue special assessment bonds. 
The Type IV development concept involves public decisions on 
what improvements to install coupled with private financing of those 
improvements. The developer, or the new resident through higher lot 
prices, finances the costs of the improvements. Actual practice does 
not conform exactly to the theoretical model. In practice the devel-
oper does have a substantial area of decision with respect to where 
and when to develop, but his decisions relative to what improvements 
are to be installed and how they are to be financed are tightly con-
strained by local public authorities through subdivision control and 
other regulations. 
The Type IV concept--modified in practice as indicated above--
although permitted under Nebraska State law has been rarely used in 
the Omaha Area. It is, however, the prevailing mode of development 
throughout the rest of the nation. 
The procedure usually followed under the Type IV development 
concept is that the developer, after receiving approval of his pre-
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liminary subdivision plat, files for approval of his final plat and 
posts a bond assuring the governmental authority that he will install 
the improvements as indicated in his preliminary plat approval. If 
he has a large development, he may file for final plat approval and 
post bond for only one section at a time. Final plat approval, 
coupled with his posted bond, permits him to start selling his lots 
and/or building his houses at the same time he is installing his 
improvements, and to use part of the proceeds from such sales to pay 
the cost of the improvements. 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions and observations can be drawn from 
the foregoing discussion of the SID law, the SID development process, 
and alternatives to the SID: 
1. A very close relationship exists between the developer 
and the SID boacd of trustees. 
As indicated in the earlier section regarding the SID law, the 
petition to establish the SID must nominate five persons ~ho are 
owners of property within the proposed SID as trustees of the SID. 
Since the developer almost always owns all of the property within 
the SID, he has to give relatives, friends and/or business associates 
some sort of interest in the development venture so they can serve 
on the board of trustees. The developer may propose his wife, adult 
children, his engineer, and/or his lawyer, among others, as members 
of the board of trustees. This makes for some interesting relation-
ships which were described in the section on SID boards of trustees 
and principal developers. (If the "developer" is a bona fide group 
of associates or a company, this legal requirement presents no 
problem, of course.) Moreover, since election to the board of 
trustees is on the basis of property ownership--with one vote for 
each acre of unplatted land own·ed and one vote for each platted lot 
owned--the developer is able to perpetuate his control of the SID 
board of trustees at least as long as he retains ownership or more 
than half of the land in the SID. 
The consequence of this situation is that the SID becomes simply 
an extension of the developer and, in effect, invests him with certain 
govArnmental powers. Specifically, he is able to make public expen-
ditures and, more important, to incur public debts for which others 
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eventually have to assume responsibility: home buyers in the SID 
or city taxpayers, if the SID is annexed. Necessarily, therefore, 
the question must be raised--as the Legislature's Miscellaneous 
Subjects Committee has--whether or not the future interests of those 
home buyers and city taxpayers are sufficiently protected. 
2. A very close relatioaship exists between the SID and 
the bond house. 
As indicated in the description of the SID development process 
and as revealed by CAUR's interviews of bond house representatives, 
the bond house is an essential and integral part of the SID develop-
ment process almost from the very beginning. The bond house in 
effect acts as fiscal manager for the SID from the time the SID 
enters into the warrant and bond marketing agreement until the SID 
is annexed or all debt obligations are paid off: watching the SID's 
expenditures, making sure mill levies are established when they 
should be, and keeping tabs on the SID's plans. This extra effort, 
which is substantially more than a bond house normally exerts when 
handling bond issues for a city or school district, for example, is 
cited as the reason why bond houses must charge SID's higher fees. 
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A strong case can be made that on balance the close supervision c 
of SID finances by the bond houses has had the effect of significantly t 
improving the financial soundness of many SID's. At the same time, 
however, it is legitimate to ask the question whether or not it is 
in the best interest of the general public for this supervision to 
be performed by private agencies with a substantial financial stake 
in the outcome. 
3. The structure of SID's as established by law encourages 
SID board of trustees to (1) shift the financing of 
development as much as possible to a general obligation 
basis, and (2) keep the property tax mill levy low in the 
early stages of the development. 
This conclusion follows quite naturally from the earlier con-
clusion on the close relationship between the developer and the SID 
board of trustees. The more improvements cost the developer, through 
his control of the SID board of trustees, can shift to general obliga-
tion financing--hence to the home buyer and ultimately to the munici-
pality upon annexation--the less he has to pay through Special assess-
ments on his lots. This is not said as a condemnation of developers; 
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it would require an unusually high degree of altruism on the part of 
a developer not to push this division as far as he legitimately can 
to his own advantage. In addition, it is to the developer's direct 
financial advantage to keep the property tax mill levy low during 
the early stages of the development--again through the control the 
law gives him of the SID board of trustees--so as to minimize his 
outlay for taxes on his unsold lots and to provide a selling point 
to prospective home buyers. 
4. Although the SID is credited with spurring the development 
of urban areas in Nebraska (particularly Omaha), urban 
development has taken place both in Nebraska and nationally 
without the SID mechanism. 
Over the 1960-1970 period, the City of Omaha's population grew 
by 15.2 percent (including annexations).~ Development during this 
period of time was almost exclusively via the SID, or Type II devel-
opment approach (private decisions on improvements and public 
financing.) Yet, the City of Lincoln which is a prime example of 
the Type III development approach (public decisions on improvements 
and public financing) grew at a rate of 16.3 percent. Although the 
two cities differ substantially in size, the fact remains that a 
city in Nebraska can successfully use a development concept other 
:ly than the SID. 
:;s-
" . 0 I 
Nationally, of the 242 metropolitan areas (other than Omaha) 
reported in the 1970 Census, 89 (36.8 percent) had higher rates of 
population growth than did Omaha; a further indication that urban 
development can take place without the SID.2/ Hence, the occurrence 
of urban growth in Nebraska via the SID should not obscure the fact 
that it has also taken place without the SID--a fact which questions 
the purported superiority of the SID to other (e.g., Type III and 
Type IV) development concepts. 
~!u.s. Bureau of the Census, United states Summary, Number of 
Inhabitants, Table 40, Population Annexed to Central Cities of 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas Between 1960 and 1970, by 
SMSA. (Data relate to the legal limits of the central cities and 
standard metropolitan statistical areas as defined for 1970.) 
~/Ibid. The data refer to the legal limits of the 242 central 
cities as defined for 1970. The "inside central cities" totals 
were used for the larger SMSA's. 
I 
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5. 1'he _ _'!:y£.E)_J.~ __ e>_r:t_d__T~ II I development concepts_ reduce 
the amount of front-end money required of the developer 
in the development process. 
Both Type II and Type III development concepts provide for 
public financing of improvements. Hence, they constitute a definite 
advantage in the development process from the standpoint of devel-
opers. The element of public financing of improvements allows the 
developer to reduce the amount of risk capital invested in the 
project and, consequently, provides an opportunity for lower lot 
and housing costs and for higher-quality improvements. The financial 
advantages offered also encourage more competition from smaller 
developers who could not pay the high costs associated with providing 
improvements. It should be noted, however, that this is a two-way 
street. The same advantages offer the potential for over-building 
an area, and encourage marginal developers to enter the field. 
6. The Type II and Type III development concepts permit 
incorporation of regional needs into developments. 
The public financing feature of development concepts II and 
III are particularly relevant to securing the provision of excess 
capacities of water and sewer trunk lines, traffic thoroughfares, 
etc. required to meet present and future regional needs over and 
above the needs of the particular development. The provision of 
such excess capacities clearly is the responsibility of the govern-
mental authority rather than the developer. Under development concept 
II--the SID approach--these excess capacities can be financed through 
general obligation bonds issued by the SID, which are later assumed 
by the municipality if and_ when the SID is annexed; under development 
concept III these excess capacities can be financed directly by the 
municipality either out of general revenues or through general 
obligation bonds of its own. Development concepts I and IV--utilizing 
private financing of improvements--lack a ready mechanism for providing 
the excess capacities required by present and future regional needs 
during the development process; hence, these usually have to be 
provided later by the public authority at greatly increased expense. 
From the standpoint of the general public interest, this capability 
to provide for regional needs is probably the single most important 
advant.age of development concepts II and III. 
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7. The quality of improvements installed in new developments 
depends at least as much on the standards established and 
enforced by the public authority as on the method(s) 
available for financing the cost of those improvements. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that initial use of 
the SID mechanism in the Omaha area in the early 1950's had little 
appreciable effect on the quality of improvements installed in new 
developments. It was only when the City adopted and began enforcing 
minimum improvement standards through its subdivision regulations 
that standard quality improvements were obtained. This conclusion 
is also supported by a nationwide survey of 1,115 cities over 10,000 
population conducted in the spring of 1973. 101 Nine hundred twenty-
five, or 83 percent, of these cities had subdivision regulations 
requiring the installation of improvements by developers. Ninety 
percent of the cities with such regulations rated them as being 
very effective or effective in accomplishing their purpose. In 
addition, almost half of the cities included in this survey required 
developers either to dedicate land for public purposes such as parks 
or make a cash contribution in lieu of such a dedication. 
8. The laws concerning voting for SID boards of trustees may 
conflict with the constitutional principle of one-person 
one-vote. 
Voting for the SID board of trustees is restricted to property 
owners and is based on one vote for each acre of unplatted lot. In 
ept elections held six years after the first election, two of the board 
~t 
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members are elected by resident owners. 
A number of United States Supreme Court cases have extended the 
principle of one-person one-vote to local government (Avery vs. 
Midland County, 390 US 474) and to special districts (Hadley vs. 
Junior College District, 397 US 50). Property qualifications for 
school board elections (Kramer vs. Union School District, 395 US 
621), and for gene-ral obligation bond elections (Phoenix vs. 
Kolodziejski, 399 US 204) have been struck down specifically. 
It should be noted that the rarely used 1947 SID Act extended 
the right to vote in SID elections to legal voter residents whether 
lO/Steve Carter, Murray Frost, Claire Rubin, and Lyle Sumek, 
Environmental Management and Local Government (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of Research and Development, u.s. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 1974), p. 39. 
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or not they were property owners in the SID, and did not count votes 
on the basis of the amount of property owned. 
In addition, some of the other states utilizing devices similar 
to the SID use the one-person one-vote principle (imposed either by 
legislation or the courts). For example, in Burrey vs. Embarcadero 
Municipal Improvement District (97 Cal. Rpts. 203), the California 
courts ruled in 1971 that the improvement district created by the 
state legislature could not have votes cast on the basis of assessed 
value or be restricted to landowners. 
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Chapter II 
THE FISCAL STRUCTURE OF SANITARY AND IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 
Sanitary and improvement districts constitute an important 
segment of the Omaha Area's economy. In 1973, a peak year for SID 
development activity, SID's contributed approximately $28.5 million 
to the Omaha Area economy as measured by the volume of warrants 
registered that year in the County Treasurer's Office. This Chapter 
analyzes the fiscal structure whereby SID's carry out their activ-
ities and the impact of those activities on taxes and public debt 
in the Omaha Area. All percentages were derived from original data. 
Assessed Value and Debt 
An understanding of the relationship between bonded debt and 
assessed value for annexed and unannexed SID's provides a basis for 
understanding the tax burden (both past and present) imposed by 
SID's on home buyers and on City residents when SID's are annexed. 
A total of $310,254,520 in assessed property values is associated 
with SID's in Douglas and Sarpy Counties. In the process of building 
this tax base, a total of $101.4 million in bonded debt has been 
issued for SID's in the two counties ($84.3 million in Douglas and 
$17.1 million in Sarpy). As of January 20, 1975, $91,941,500 
remained outstanding ($76,058,000 for Douglas and $15,883,500 for 
Sarpy) . 1!/ 
Table 2 presents an overview of the significance of SID's by 
showing the amount of bonded debt, assessed value and debt ratios 
for the two counties, the annexed and unannexed SID's, and the other 
parts of the counties which are not affected by SID's. SID's currently 
account for 21.9 percent of the total assessed value for the two 
counties and 72.4 percent of the general obligation bonded debt. The 
percentages differ by county with SID's accounting for 20.2 percent 
of the assessed value and 71.0 percent of the bonded debt in Douglas 
County versus 34.6 percent of the assessed value and 79.3 percent of 
ll/Nebraska State Auditor's Office. Bonded debt unless otherwise 
indicated refers to general obligation bonds. In addition to the 
amounts shown above there was $70.8 million in registered warrants 
outstanding as of December 31, 1974 for Douglas County SID's. The 
amount currently outstanding in Sarpy County was not compiled. 
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TABLE 2 
ASSESSED VALUES, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDED DEBTy, AND DEBT RATIOS 
FOR DOUGLAS AND SARPY COUNTIES~ 
County 
Douglas 
Sarpy 
Total Douglas-Sarpy County 
e/ Douglas County-
Annexed SID's 
Unannexed SID's 
Other 
Assessed Value 
(AS) 
(35% Valuation) 
b/ 1,253,958,65'F; 
165,839,231£. 
$1,419,797,890 
1,253,958,659 I 
119,123,667.& 
133,743,105 
1,001,091,887 
941,747,ll8 Omaha City Proper 
(excludes annexed SID's) 
All Other 59,344,769 
f/ Sarpy County-
Annexed SID's 
Unannexed SID' s 
Other 
Cities/Villages 
(excludes annexed SID's) 
All Other 
165,839,231 
15,210,905 
42,176,843 
108,451,483 
69,463,924 
38,987,559 
General Obligation 
Bonded Debt 
(GO) 
l07,064,000d/ 
20,023,50o=-
$127,087,500 
107,064,000 
42,272,500 
33,785,500 
31,006,000 
29,930,000 
1,076,000 
20,023,500 
4,210,000 
11,673,500 
4,140,000 
4,140,000 
-0-
Debt Ratio 
(GO/ AS x 100) 
8.5 
12.1 
9.0 
8.5 
35.5 
25.3 
3.1 
3.2 
1.8 
12.1 
27.7 
27.7 
3.8 
6.0 
-0-
~/Includes the assessed value of all property (real and personal) as of 
January 1, 1975 and excludes the general obligation debt of school districts. 
~/Estimated by Douglas County Assessor's Office as of January 1, 1975. 
_£./Data from "1974 Abstract of Assessments and Levies, Sarpy County." 
i/Includes $15.9 million in SID debt as of 1/20/75 (State Auditors Records) 
and $4.05 million in general obligation debt outstanding in Bellevue, Papillion, 
Gretna, Springfield and LaVista (exclusive of debt associated with annexed SID's). 
The debt of the above-mentioned villages was from First Mid-America, Statistical 
Information of Nebraska Municipal Subdivisions, 1974. 
~/The breakdown between annexed SID's and city proper debt was provided by the 
City Finance Department. The general obligation debt was also provided by the City 
Finance Department. 
i/Bonded debt data was obtained from the State Auditor's Records and is as of 
January 20, 1975. The allocation of debt between unannexed and annexed SID's was 
derived from the listing on "1974 Abstracts of Assessments and Levies, Sarpy County. 
Since information on assessed values of annexed SID's in Sarpy County was not 
available, the ratio of bonded debt to assessed value for unannexed SID's in Sarpy 
was applied to estimate the assessed value for annexed SID's. 
_g_/Inflated by use of the price index for new single family houses sold in the 
North Central Region of the United States (see Table 4). 
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the bonded debt in Sarpy County. 
Annexed Douglas County SID's. For the purposes of this section 
SID's can best be examined by looking at annexed and unannexed SID's 
separately. Table 3 presents assessed values, bonded debts, and debt 
ratios for Omaha (including annexed SID's) over the 1960-1975 period. 12 / 
over this period, Omaha's assessed value increased by 115 percent 
00) 
($493 million to $1,061 million) while the bonded debt increased by 
533 percent (from $11.4 million to $72.2 million). 
As Table 3 indicates most of Omaha's absolute increase in general 
obligation bonded debt from 1960 to 1975 is attributable to debt 
obligations incurred by the City through annexation of SID's. The City 
of Omaha's bonded debt increased by $60.9 million from 1960 to 1975, 
$42. 3 .. million of this increase, or almost 70 percent, can be traced 
to annexed SID's. In contrast, the City's assessed value increased by 
$567.9 million from 1960 to 1975. However, only $119.1 million of 
this increase or approximately 21 percent, is attributable to annexed 
SID's. In computing the values associated with annexed SID's, assessed 
values were adjusted for inflation. Thus the dollar value of an 
SID that was annexed, for example in 1961, is stated in terms of 1975 
dollars. This was accomplished by use of the price index for new 
single family houses sold in the Northcentral Region of the United 
States (see Table 4). 
Of even greater significance is the fact that nearly all of the 
increase in Omaha's debt ratio (debt as a percent of assessed value) 
can be attributed to debt assumed by the annexation of SID's. Omaha's 
debt ratio in 1960 was 2.3. In 1975 its debt ratio stands at 6.8; an 
increase of 4.5. Without the debt associated with the annexation of 
). SID's, Omaha's bonded debt would have increased by $18.5 million 
the 
between 1960 and 1975 while its assessed value would have increased 
by $448.7 million. Its debt ratio, then, in 1975 would stand at 3.2 
ity Therefore, 3.6 or 80 percent, of the 4.5 increase in Omaha's debt ratio 
between 1960 and 1975 is attributable to the debt assumed by the City 
of 
s 
nty. 
py 
he 
from annexed SID's, while only 0.9, or 20 percent, of that increase is 
attributable to the increase in non-SID associated debt. 
12/ 
--SID's annexed to Omaha only. 
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Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Omaha 
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TABLE 3 
ASSESSED VALUES, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDED/DEBTS, AND 
DEBT RATIOS FOR OMAHA, 1960-197~ 
Assessed Value General Obligation Debt Ratio 
(AS) Bonded Debt (expressed as a percent) 
(35% Valuation) (GO) (GO/AS X 100) 
$ 493,006,073 $ 11,391,000 2.3 
518,706,683 14,989,187 2.9 
532,556,795 16,814,187 3.2 
560,732,890 27,229,000 4.9 
580,616,230 31,359,000 5.4 
617,611,225 33,831,000 5.5 
642,783,245 34,588,000 5.4 
798,654,950 36,119,000 4.5 
702,509,878 40,165,500 5.7 
760,638,713 40,685,500 5.3 
783,376,465 51,462,500 6.6 
796,942,789 76,781,500 9.6 
936,418,475 81,811,500 8.7 
972,251,755 78,265,500 8.0 
1,014,353,590 79,034,500 7.8 
1,060,870,785 72,202,500 6.8 
Proper: (29,930,000) (3. 2) 
Annexed SID's 
(941, 747,118\/ 
(119,123,667)- (42,272,500) (35. 5) 
~/First Mid-America, Inc., Statistical Information of Nebraska Municipal 
Subdivisions, 1960-1975. The City Finance Department of Omaha provided bonded 
debt data for 1970 through 1974 and assessed value data for 1973 and 1974. All 
data are as of January 1 of the respective years. 
~/Estimated by accounting for inflation. See Table 4. The assessed value 
includes SID's annexed in 1959. 
:) Year 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Total 
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TABLE 4 
ASSESSED VALUE OF ANNEXED SID'S IN 1975 DOLLARS~/ 
Total Assessed 
Value 
(35% Valuation) 
$ 1,258,440 
681,925 
1,141,430 
24,515,035 
1,480,945 
5,396,295 
6,527,285 
13,121,589 
11,838,855 
1,012,015 
2,753,880 
1,610,810 
9,700,525 
$81,039,029 
(Jan. 1975=100) 
Price Index of New 
One-Family Houses 
Sold in North Central 
Region 
56.7 
58.0 
58.4 
58.9 
59.4 
58.7 
60.7 
63.8 
66.4 
70.2 
76.9 
77.2 
79.6 
84.1 
92.3 
Adjusted SID-Value 
in 1975 Dollars 
$ 2,219,471 
1,175,733 
1,954,503 
41,763,262 
2,439, 778 
8,458,143 
9,830,248 
18,691,722 
15,395,130 
1,310,900 
3,459,648 
1,915,351 
10,509,778 
$119,123,667 
~/Construction Reports, C27-74-4, Price Index of New One-Family Houses Sold 
(includes the value of lot) for North Central Region of U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Department of Commerce, March, 1975. Price indices for 1959-1962 were estimated 
through the relationship between the Consumer Price Index of housing and the 
price index of new one-family houses sold in the North Central Region. 
I 
I 
• 
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Omaha's net long-term debt from 1968 to 1973 is presented in 
Table 5. Omaha's net debt grew by 141 percent over the 1968-1973 
period versus an average debt growth of 33.1 percent for the 42 
largest cities in the United States. In fact, only Washington, D.C., 
had a rate exceeding Omaha's. And, as the City-proper/annexed SID 
relationships indicate, a major part of the debt increase can be 
attributed to Omaha's annexation of SID's. 
Two additional points concerning the debt of annexed SID's 
merit comment. First, as Table 6 illustrates, a higher mill levy 
on SID's before their annexation would have lowered the obligation 
passed on to the City. If the total City mill levy had been applied 
in each year of SID existence before annexation, another $3.3 million 
in revenue would have been raised and thus not added to the City's 
debt. 
Second, Omaha's debt attributable to annexed SID's imposes a 
major burden on residents of the City. Almost $2.2 million per year 
must be paid for interest charges on the $42.3 million annexed SID 
debt currently outstanding. In other words an estimated two mills 
annually are needed on the City's total assessed valuation to service 
the debt incurred by annexed SID's. (This is based on an effective 
average interest rate of 5.09 percent for City-issued general obli-
gation bonds.) If the City were to retire the bonded debt associated 
with annexed SID's (i.e., $42,272,500) over a 20-year period at 5.10 
percent, it would cost $67,516,825 or about $3.4 million per year.!l/ 
Since a one-mill levy in Omaha at the present time yields approximately 
1.1 million dollars in revenue, this cost amounts to 3.2 mills per 
year. It would cost an individual with a $20,000 home approximately 
$22 per year for the next 20 years. The levy on a $30,000 home 
would be $34 per year and for a $40,000 home the cost would be $45 
annually. On a per capita basis the levy amounts to a $12 to $13 
burden annually on each individual in the City of Omaha over the 20 
years. 
Another way of viewing the significance of the debt is to examine 
!liThe interest rate used was 5.10 percent rather than 5.09 
the sake of convenience. This allowed the use of the Thorndike 
E;:;::.:n-=cf'y--'c'-'1=-o'-'p'-e~dc::i'"'a;_;o'-'f=---'B;;.a=n.:,;kc;;i:.:;n,_,g~&=-=-F=i.::n:.::a:.:.n:..:c:.:~=-· a=l-=T.::a:=b:..:l:..:e::.:s:.. (New York : Warren , 
Gorham and Lamont, 1973). 
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TABLE 5 
GROWTH IN NET LONG TERM DEBT OUTSTANDING FOR 42 LARGEST CITIES2} 
Year Percent Year Percent 
1968-69 ..::.;:=- 1972-73 Change 1968-69 ..::..:r=- 1972-73 Change 
City ($000) ($000) 1968-1973 City ($000) ($000) 1968-1973 
1. Atlanta 226,006 460,829 103.9 22. Milwaukee 209' 771 204,666 -2.4 
2. Baltimore 497,249 494,866 -0.5 23. Minneapolis 79,307 103,353 30.3 
3. Birmingham 106,997 205,311 91.9 24. Newark 86,247 142,911 65.7 
4. Boston 169,425 335,791 98.2 25. New Orleans 220,309 225,847 2.5 
5. Buffalo 153,893 210,619 36.9 26. New York 6,151,928 7,994,047 29.9 
6. Chicago 783,422 1,058,784 35.2 27. Norfolk 119,278 176,395 48.0 
7. Cincinnati 224,459 233,413 4.0 28. Oakland 55,026 78,632 42.9 
8. Cleveland 273,109 258,075 -5.5 29. Oklahoma 246,594 276,033 11.9 I 
N 
9. Columbus 129,211 230,620 78.5 30. Omaha 42,576 102,400 140.5 'f' 
10. Dallas 267,174 379,256 42.0 31. Philadelphia 796,648 1,046,406 31.4 
11. Denver 226,645 277,470 22.4 32. Phoenix 150,971 202,842 34.4 
12. Detroit 526' 477 637,431 21.1 33. Pittsburgh 89,855 100,135 11.4 
13. Fort Worth 115,707 163,569 41.4 34. Portland 47,958 30,367 -36.7 
14. Honolulu 175,668 201,960 15.0 35. St. Louis 152,126 155,089 2.0 
15. Houston 390,932 474,594 21.4 36. St. Paul 114,964 154,481 34.4 
16. Indianapolis 127,349 245,005 92.4 37. San Antonio 170,904 201,413 17.9 
17. Kansas City 251,059 269,551 7.4 38. San Diego 123,754 129,061 4.3 
18. Long Beach 30,832 53,719 74.2 39. San Francisco 277' 078 339,407 22.5 
19. Los Angeles 1,167,691 1,758,228 50.6 40. Seattle 252,520 340,888 35.0 
20. Louisville 146,688 188,037 28.2 41. Toledo 31,961 43,978 37.6 
21. Memphis 345,411 460,793 33.4 42. Washington, D.C. 261,853 665,210 154.0 
~City Government Finances, 1968-69 (Table 6) and 1972-73 (Table 7), Social and Economic Statistics Administration, 
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. Net long-term debt is the long-term debt outstanding minus long-term 
debt offsets (i.e., cash and investment assets of sinking funds and other reserve. funds which are held for redemption of 
long-term debt). 
I 
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TABLE 6 
ADDITIONAL REVENUE THAT ANNEXED SID'S COULD HAVE GENERATED IF 
OMAHA'S MILL LEVY WERE APPLIED IN EACH YEAR OF EXISTENCE BEFORE ANNEXATION 
Assessed Value Additional Revenue if 
of SID's Prioli./ City Mill Levy were 
Year City Levy to Annexation- Applied to Annexed SID's 
1960 20.4 $ 9,439,350 $ 120,615 
1961 22.4 11,831,018 204,097 
1962 22.4 22,189,490 393,601 
1963 22.4 35,273,198 621,641 
1964 22.9 46,180,031 587,639 
1965 23.9 28,102,948 305,450 
1966 21.2 35,423,070 352,854 
1967 25.5 30,369' 542 385,775 
1968 25.0 31,140,832 299,669 
1969 26.2 19,464,720 150,721 
1970 26.2 9,891,390 -31,223 
1971 24.6 10,818,875 -51,780 
1972 25.6 9,575,305 -76,843 
Total $3,262,216 
a/ 
-Compiled by CAUR from data provided by First Mid-America, Inc., Statistical 
Information of Nebraska Municipal Subdivisions, 1960-1973. 
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the cost to Omaha residents based on the portion of Omaha's current 
mill levy that is used to retire debt. Currently 9.5 mills are 
applied to debt retirement. Since the City is currently responsible 
for $72.5 million in debt and since 59 percent of the debt can be 
attributed to annexed SID's, it follows that approximately 5.6 mills 
are being applied annually to pay off the debt of annexed SID's. At 
this rate, and assuming the assessed value for the City remains 
constant, it would take approximately nine years to pay off the BID-
associated debt, costing the homeowner with a $30,000 home about 
$59 per year over the nine-year period. 
Is it possible for the annexed SID's to pay off their own debt? 
Given their total bonded debt of $42.3 million, a constant assessed 
value of $119.1 million, an effective interest rate of 5.10 percent, 
a 20-year debt retirement period (the typical term for an SID bond 
issue), and a 9.5 mill levy (that portion of the City levy applied to 
debt retirement), the annexed SID's could not pay off the debt. For 
example, the first year's interest charge would be about $2.2 million 
while revenues from property would be about $1.1 million. To pay off 
the annual interest alone would require a tax of 18.1 mills applied to 
the assessed value of the annexed SID's. In order to pay off in 20 
years the debt the City assumed when it annexed these SID's, it would 
be necessary to apply the total revenue derived from the assessed 
value of the annexed SID's at the current City mill levy of 28.3 
mills. 
Unannexed Douglas County SID's. In addition to the annexed 
SID's, another 135 unannexed SID's are developed or being developed 
in Douglas County. The total assessed value of these SID's as of 
December 31, 1974 was $133.7 million while the net debt (bonds and 
registered warrants outstanding minus cash and investments and 
special assessments receivable) was $88.0 million. Their overall 
debt ratio, therefore, is 68.8. Outstanding bonds accounted for 
$33.8 million of the net debt, yielding a bonded debt ratio of 25.3. 
The debt ratios of unannexed SID's vary considerably. Most of 
this variation can be related to the length of life of the SID and 
it is normal to expect very new SID's to have high debt ratios. This 
is borne out by Table 7. Nine unannexed SID's were established during 
the 1958-1961 period, 50 were established between 1962 and 1966, 39 
between 1967 and 1971, and 37 from 1972 through 1974. The respective 
~ I 
I I 
I 
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TABLE 7 
BONDED DEBT AND NET DEBT RATIOS BY SELECTED TIME;PERIODS 
FOR UNANNEXED SID'S IN DOUGLAS COUNTY~ 
Total Bonded Debt 
Number Ratio Net Net Debt Ratio 
Year of Assessed Value Bonds (expressed as District (expressed as 
Established SID's ( 3S% Valuation) Outstanding a percent) Debt a percent) 
19S8-1961£_/ 9 $ 21,803,980 $ 1,438,000 6.60 $ 1,SS3, 341 7. 12 
1962-1966.£/ so 62,066,61S 16,627,SOO 26.79 18,S46,441 29.88 
1967-1971~/ 39 43,719 ,42S 1S,620,000 3S. 73 39,618,SS4 90.62 
1972-197~/ 37 6,1S3,08S -0- 28,2S4,680 4S9.20 
13S $133,743, 10S $33, 68S ,ooo£.1 2S. 19 $87,973,01~/ 65.78 
~/Compiled by CAUR from data provided by the City of Omaha, Finance Department. 
Data are as of December 31, 1974. 
b/ 
-The assessed value for SID 4S was not available, consequently, the $100,000 
bonds outstanting and the $166,244 net district debt were not included. 
_£/The total number of SID's (SO) excludes SID 173 which had an unknown assessed 
value and no debt. 
i/The total number of SID's (39) excludes SID's 197, 211, and 213 which had 
no assessed value and no debt. 
~/The total number of SID's (37) excludes SID's 270 and 274 which had no 
assessed value and no debt. 
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net debt ratios for each group as of December 31, 1974 were: 1958-61 
(7.1); 1962-66 (29.9); 1967-71 (90.6); and 1972-74 (459.2). The 
respective bonded debt ratios for the first three groups were 6.6, 
26.8, and 35.7. (No bonded debt had been issued for SID's established 
since 1972.) Further detail on bonded debt and net debt of unannexed 
SID's by year of establishment from 1958 through 1974 is presented in 
Table 8, and the financial picture of all unannexed SID's in Douglas 
County as of December 31, 1974 is given in Appendix B. 
Sarpy County SID's. Table 9 presents financial data on Sarpy 
County municipalities. As of December 31, 1974 the Cities of Bellevue, 
Papillion, Gretna, Springfield, and LaVista had a total assessed 
value of $84.7 million and a total bonded debt of $8.4 million, 
resulting in a bonded debt ratio of 9.9. The total bonded debt 
balance as of January 20, 1975 for all Sarpy County SID's was $15.9 
million. Annexed SID's had a debt balance of $4.2 million, which 
constitutes slightly more than 50 percent of the total $8.4 million 
debt for the five municipalities in Sarpy County. 
Sarpy County SID's which have not been annexed had a total 
assessed value of $42.2 million as of December 31, 1974 and a bonded 
debt balance of $11.7 million as of January 20, 1975, yielding a 
bonded debt ratio of 27.7. This debt ratio is about 2.7 times as 
high as that for Sarpy County's five municipalities and about the 
same as the ratios associated with unannexed SID's in Douglas County. 
Administrative costs of SID and Non-SID Development 
This section compares administrative costs as a proportion of 
total construction costs for SID and non-SID development in order to 
determine the reasonableness of SID administrative costs. The Public 
Works Department of the City of Omaha provided information on a 
portion of the Millard Heights addition as representative of City-
administered development. Although most of Millard Heights was 
developed as an SID, the city installed the improvements for a portion 
consisting of 91 contiguous lots after Millard Heights was annexed 
by the City. CAUR then selected four SID's--146, 167, 189 and 233--
with characteristics very similar to this portion of Millard Heights 
for purposes of comparison. 
Table 10 compares administrative costs (cost for engineering, 
testing, legal services and miscellaneous), as a proportion of total 
Number 
Year of 
Established SID's 
1958 
195~/ 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966.£/ 
1 
1 
2 
5 
8 
10 
9 
8 
15 
6 
7 
7 
3 
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TABLE 8 
BONDED DEBT AND NET DEBT RATIOS BY YEAR / 
FOR UN ANNEXED SID'S IN DOUGLAS COUNTY~ 
Assessed Value 
197 4-75 Bonds 
(35% Valuation) Outstanding 
$ 5,748,620 
NA 
2,359,380 
13,695,980 
13,989,250 
11,970,235 
10,026,690 
4,537,650 
21,542,790 
17' 985' 280 
4,613,920 
3,655,715 
1,121,525 
$ 400,000 
100,000 
36 7,000 
671,000 
Bonded Debt 
Ratio 
(expressed as 
a percent) 
6.96 
15.55 
4.90 
23.63 
28.35 
37.22 
33.94 
21.61 
39.73 
54.73 
32. 14 
98.08 
$ 
Net Net Debt Ratio 
District (expressed as 
Debt a percent) 
931,350 
166,244 
269,547 
352,444 
2,513,872 
3,618,289 
3, 754,020 
3,437,258 
5,223,002 
10,594,784 
1,645,431 
3,525,282 
2,908,676 
16.20 
11.42 
2.5 7 
17.97 
30.23 
37.44 
75. 75 
24.24 
58.91 
35.66 
96.43 
196 7 
1968~./ 
196<F1 
1970 
1971 
1972 
197:!-1 
1974 
16 
22 
12 
16,342' 985 
5,491,420 
606' 840 
54, 825 
3,306,000 
3,394,000 
3,732,000 
1 '540' 000 
4,655,500 
7,145,000 
2,525,000 
1,175,000 
1,100,000 
3,6 75,000 22.49 20,944,381 
259. 35 
128.16 
346. 11 -0-
-0-
3 -0-
Total 135 $133,743,105 $33,785,500 
19,006,408 
8,701,798 
546,474 
25.1~/ $88,139,260 
1433.95 
996.76 
65. 7s&1 
~/Compiled by CAUR from data provided by the City of Omaha, Finance Depart-
ment. Data are as of December 31, 1974. 
~/Assessed value data was not available for SID 45. 
c/ 
-The total number of SID's (15) excludes SID 173 which had an unknown 
assessed value and no debt. 
~/The total number of SID's (7) excludes SID 197 which had no assessed 
value and no debt. 
e/ 
-The total number of SID's (7) excludes two SID's which had no assessed 
value and no debt (SID 211 and SID 217). 
i/The total number of SID's (12) excludes two SID's which had no assessed 
value and no debt (SID 270 and SID 274). 
£/calculations exclude 1959 bonded debt and net district debt. 
Sarpy 
Ci 
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Total 
Count: 
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7 
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TABLE 9 
ASSESSED VALUES, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDED DEBTS, / 
DEBT RATIOS, AND MILL LEVIES FOR SARPY COUNTY URBAN AREAS~ 
Sarpy County Assessed Value General Obligation Bonded Debt 
Cities (35% Valuation) Bonded Debt Ratio Mills 
Bellevue $49,797,747 $4,845,000 9.7 
Papillion 14,482,451 994,000 6.9 
Gretna 3,648,847 469,000 12.9 
Springfield 1,537,438 498,000 32.4 
LaVista 15,208,346 1,544,000 10.2 
Total $84,674,829 $8,350,000 9.9 
~/Assessed values from "1974 Abstract of Assessment and Levies, Sarpy 
County, Nebraska." Bonded Debt is balance per State Auditor's Records on 
January 20, 1975. 
21.5 
23.0 
26.9 
35.0 
26.4 
26.6 
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TABLE 10 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTRUCTION COStS 
FOR SID AND NON-SID DEVELOPMENTS~ 
Construction Administrative 
SID and Non-SID Projects Cost Cost 
Total 
Cost 
Administrative Cost 
As Percent of 
Construction Cost 
Millard Heights: 
Sanitary Sewer $ 36,088.10 
Paving and Storm Sewer 131,121.93 
SID's 
Sanitary Sewer 
SID 146 6,081.99 
SID 16 7 16,129.27 
Paving and Storm Sewer 
SID 16 71?_/ 6' 894.96 
SID 16 7 110,011.21 
SID 189 41' 463.04 
SID 233 171,875.32 
SID 146 26,462.47 
Total $378,918.26 
$ 4,330.57 
15,724.62 
4,296.50 
13,572.73 
4,568.20 
67,701.49 
14,512.06 
49,156.03 
8,951.77 
$162,758.78 
$ 40,418.67 
146,856.55 
10,378.49 
29,702.00 
11,463. 16 
177' 712. 70 
55,975.10 
221,031.24 
35,414.24 
$541 '6 77. 04 
~/Public Works Department and Finance Department, City of Omaha. 
E_l Paving only. 
12.0 
12.0 
70.6 
84.2 
66.3 
61.5 
25.9 
28.6 
33.8 
42.9 
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construction costs for these four SID's with such costs for the 91-lot 
portion of the Millard Heights' addition. The data in Table 10 indicate 
strongly that administrative costs are excessively high in SID devel-
opments as compared to similar non-SID (in this case City) develop-
ments. The City of Omaha charges 12 percent of the total construction 
cost for administrative costs. This guideline has been used in the 
City's past projects, including the Millard Heights' development. In 
comparison with the City's 12 percent fee, administrative costs asso-
ciated with the sample SID construction projects ranged from 25.9 
percent to 84.2 percent of total construction costs. The two SID's 
completing sanitary sewer improvements had administrative cost 
percentages from six to seven times higher than the City rates. For 
paving and storm sewer improvements, the administrative rates were 
about 3.5 times higher than the City rate. 
Further detailed data on administrative and construction costs 
for annexed and unannexed SID's in Douglas County are given in 
Appendix C. These data show that administrative costs (represented 
by the columns entitled "Legal Fees," "Engineering and Architectural 
Costs," "Fiscal Agent Fees" and "Other Costs" in Appendix C) vary 
significantly among both annexed and unannexed SID's. Also, for the 
annexed SID's these four categories of administrative costs were 
about 17.6 percent of total construction costs while for the unannexed 
SID's they were about 20.1 percent of total construction costs. It 
should be noted that the data in Appendix C are not comparable to the 
Data in Table 10. Some costs included in the "Equipment and Service 
Cost" column of Appendix C would be classed as administrative costs 
according to the City of Omaha's definition and some would be classed 
as construction costs. 
Distribution of Improvement Costs Between Special Assessment and 
General Obligation Financing. 
A comparison of the distribution by SID's of improvement costs 
between special assessment and general obligation financing methods 
with the distribution of such costs in non-SID developments points 
up some significant differences which provide additional insight 
into the impact of SID financial operations on taxes and public debt. 
Data for the 91-lot portion of the Millard Heights addition and for 
SID's 146, 167, 189 and 233 were again used for this comparison, and 
are given in Table 11. 
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TABLE 11 
COMPARISON OF THE ALLOCATION OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS AND 
GENERAL OBLIGATION ASSESSMENTS BY CITY AND SID PROJECTS~/ 
General Obligation 
Special General As Percent of 
Type of Development Assessment Obligation Total Total Assessment 
Paving and Storm Sewer 
SID 16 7 $15 7 ,464. 80 $20,247.90 $177 '712 . 70 11.4 
SID 233 145,915.48 75,115.87 221 '031. 35 34.0 
SID 189 22,809.44 33,165,66 55,975.10 59.3 
SID 146 10,797.02 10,797.02 21,594.04.!>_/ 50.0 
Millard Height~/ 111 '417. 00 36,100.00 147,518.00 24.5 
(Omaha Develop.) 
Paving Onlz 
SID 16 7 5,070.66 6,392.50 11 '463. 16 55.8 
Sanitarz Sewer 
SID 146 5,824.54 1,697.91 7,522.45<l/ 22.6 
SID 16 7 25,278.32 4, 423.68 29,702.00 14.9 
SID 233 64,050.24 -0- 64,050.24 -0-
Millard Heights 40' 418.6 7 -0- 40,418.67 -0-
~/City of Omaha Public Works Department (for the Millard Heights area) and 
City of Omaha Finance Department (for the SID's) . 
.!>_/Excludes $13,820.20 Special Assessment to School District #1. 
~/Includes the following Paving and Storm Sewer construction: Woodsdale 
Circle from Sky Park Drive to Cul De Sac, Glenwood Circle from Sky Park Drive 
to Cul De Sac, Winthrop Circle from Sky Park Drive to Cul De Sac, Winslow Place 
from Old Cherry Road to Harrison, Brookridge Drive from Sky Park Drive to 
Harrison, South Dale Drive from Winslow Place to Sky Park Drive, South Dale 
Drive from Winslow Place to Cul De Sac, Crestline Drive from Hillsdale Road 
to Brookridge Drive. 
~/Excludes $2,856.04 Special Assessment to School District #1. 
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The data in Table 11 indicate that the SID's placed a larger 
proportion of their debt (paving and storm sewer and sanitary sewer) 
into general obligation than did the City of Omaha for the 91-lot 
portion of the Millard Heights addition. The City, for example, put 
only 24.5 percent of its paving and storm sewer debt into general 
obligation (e.g., assessed to the street fund) while the combined 
percent of paving and storm sewer debt put into general obligation 
by the four SID's was 29.2. Similarly, although the sanitary sewer 
improvement work done by the City in Millard Heights was all specially 
assessed, two of the three SID's completing sanitary sewer work had 
some (14.9 and 22.6 percent) of the cost put into general obligation. 
SID Expenditure Patterns. 
Total warrant costs and interest paid (including accrued 
interest) were coded and computerized for 80 selected SID's in 
Douglas County. Of the 80 SID's, 27 had been annexed. The per 
SID value of warrants for the 80 SID's ranged from $4,469 to 
$1,775,086, while warrant length of life ranged from only a few 
months to over 13 years. 
SID Expenditure Profile. One of the objectives of the analysis 
summarized in this section was to ascertain whether or not an expen-
diture profile for SID's is evident. This analysis was limited to 
annexed SID's because active SID's are still spending money, and, 
therefore, it is not possible to determine final costs. Total warrant 
costperyear was used as the measure of expenditures. Eight annexed 
SID's were dropped from the analysis because of incomplete warrant 
data during their initial stage of development. An analysis of the 
warrant data for the remaining 19 annexed SID's shows wide variations 
in expenditures by year. A clear example of this is given in Graph 
1 which indicates the proportion of warrants issued in each year for 
the five annexed SID's in the sample with a five-year life span before 
annexation. The data show a scattered expenditure pattern with some 
SID's committing the bulk of their expenditures in the early stages 
of life and others committing their expenditures in the later stages. 
Similarly, an examination of SID's to determine whether more 
of the expenditures occurred in the first or second half of life 
indicates no clear pattern. This analysis indicates that for the 
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GRAPH 1 
WARRANTS BY YEAR 
Annexed SID's With Five Year Life Span 
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six SID's with under $100,000 in 
expenditures in the first half. 
warrants, one-half had greater 
For the five with $100,000 to 
$300,000 in warrants, two had greater expenditures in the first 
half, and the three SID's with expenditures from $300,000 to $700,000 
two had greater expenditures in the first half. Finally, for the 
three largest SID's (those with expenditures over $700,000), two had 
their greatest expenditures in the first half of their life. (Two 
of the 19 SID's were eliminated from this analysis because they had 
issued warrants in only one year and this analysis used whole years.) 
The results of the analysis represents a nearly equal division of 
expenditures and consequently are inconclusive with respect to a 
correlation between expenditures and the first or second half of an 
SID's life. 
SID Expenditures by Length of Life. A second objective of this 
analysis was to determine what proportion of SID expenditures occurred 
before the sixth year of an SID's life. This is an important age 
because of the 1974 amendment to the SID law which requires two of 
the board of trustee members to be elected by the resident property 
owners in the SID the first election after the SID is five years old. 
Table 12 indicates that virtually all of the remaining 19 annexed 
SID's analyzed in this section issued their warrants before they 
were six years old. Only four issued any warrants after their fifth 
year. These were SID's 55, 59, 84 and 129. Of these four, two 
(Nos. 84 and 129) incurred more than 90 percent of their total costs 
by the end of the fifth year and the third (No.55) incurred more 
than 73 percent. Only No. 59 did not fit the general pattern, 
incurring 79 percent of its total costs after the fifth year. Among 
the four, expenditures per SID after the fifth year ranged from 
$5,200 to $593,000. 
The pattern of expenditures by year of life for the 19 annexed 
SID's analyzed is depicted on Graph 2. The detailed data on which 
Table 12 and Graph 2 are based are given in Appendix D. 
Financing Costs of SID's. 
This section focuses on the costs associated with financing 
SID development. These include charges for marketing warrants, 
l 
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TABLE 12 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL WARRANT COST INCURRED 
BY THE SIXTH YEAR OF EXISTENCE, ANNEXED SID'S 
Percent of Cost Incurred Percent of Cost Incurred 
SID II Before Sixth Year SID II Before Sixth Year 
47 100.0 159 100.0 
55 73.5 163 100.0 
59 21.0 164 100 .0 
84 98.2 176 100.0 
85 100.0 200 100.0 
107 100.0 207. 100.0 
108 100.0 214 100.0 
120 100.0 215 100.0 
127 100.0 217 100.0 
.., 129 91.8 
'" H 
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interest charges for allowing warrants to go unpaid before converting 
them to general obligation debt, bond marketing fees associated with 
converting the warrants to bonded debt, and finally the annual 
interest on the bonded debt. Special attention is given to the 
interest costs of unpaid warrants. 
Financing Costs of an SID Development. An example of the costs 
associated with SID development will suffice to demonstrate that 
financing costs are considerable. Suppose that an SID incurs $100 
in expenditures. It issues and sells a $100 warrant to raise the 
necessary cash to pay off this claim. There is, however, a 4 percent 
charge for marketing the warrant, raising the debt to $104. Suppose 
further that the warrant is outstanding for one year at 8 percent 
interest (the average length of life for warrants) before the SID 
moves to a bond issue and pays off the warrant. The total debt at 
the end of year one will then be $112.32. Next, the SID pays a 7~ 
percent bond marketing fee, raising the total debt by $8.42 to 
$120.74. Assuming the bond can be marketed at 6.10 percent (one 
percentage point higher than Omaha's interest charge for bonded debt) 
and that the debt is to be retired in 20 years, a total of $209.28 
will be needed to pay off the debt. This is about $36 higher than 
the $173.33 which would have been required to pay off the original 
warrant value of $100 over a 20 year period at 6.10 percent. 
What should be noted is that the general obligation debt include! 
the interest cost of allowing the warrants to go unpaid for the year 
as well as the marketing fees for issuing warrants and for paying 
off the warrants by converting them to general obligation bonds. 
Consequently, a portion of the bonded debt is incurred to pay off 
interest which amounts to paying interest on interest, and another 
portion is incurred to pay off marketing fees. 
Data obtained from the 73 SID's which were analyzed in the 
previous section on the expenditure profile of SID's were used to 
determine the actual extent to which interest on unpaid warrants 
is a part of total development costs. A total of 19 annexed SID's 
and 54 unannexed SID's were included in the sample. 
Annexed SID's. For the 19 annexed SID's, interest costs were 
10 percent of the total value of registered warrants. This ranged 
from a low of 0.6 percent for one SID which was annexed in its first 
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year of active life to 29.6 percent for an SID which was active for 
nine years before annexation. The median life of warrants before 
being paid off was about one year. Although this varied from 36 
days to 5.8 years among the 19 SID's, the majority of the SID's had 
warrants whose life span ranged between 300 and 600 days before 
being paid off. 
Interest as a percentage of total warrant cost varied somewhat 
by the length of active life of the SID. Four of the 19 annexed 
SID's were active for seven or more years before annexation, and 
their interest cost averaged 12 percent of the total warrant cost. 
(This average is a weighted average as both the interest and warrant 
costs were added for the four SID's with interest then calculated 
as a percentage of total warrant cost.) 
Six SID's which had warrant costs for four and five years before 
annexation had interest that averaged 9.0 percent of total warrant 
costs. The remaining nine SID's, which had warrant costs for three 
or less years before annexation, had interest that averaged 6.8 
percent of the total value of warrants. 
What are the implications of this for the City? Interest costs 
for the annexed SID's averaged 9.1 percent of the total development 
costs (i.e., registered warrants plus interest on the warrants). 
Applying this rate to the $42.3 million general obligation debt of 
the City of Omaha which is associated with annexed SID's it can be 
concluded that about $3.85 million of that debt was interest accrued 
on SID warrants. It would take a 2.6 mill levy per year for 20 years 
on the $119.1 million estimated current assessed value of the annexed 
SID's to pay off the debt associated solely with interest costs 
passed on to the City upon annexation, assuming a 5.10 percent rate 
of interest. For the homeowner with a $40,000 home, this translates 
into $36.40 per year for 20 years. 
Unannexed SID's. Interest costs as a percentage of warrant costs 
are even higher for the 54 unannexed SID's in the sample, averaging 
11.2 percent and varying from a low of 1.6 to a high of 55.0 percent. 
In addition, the life span of warrants before being paid off is 
considerably greater in the unannexed SID's, the median being 1.9 
years. Length of warrant life varied from 0.5 years to 8.7 years. 
Six of the 30 SID's for which a warrant life span could be calculated 
had average life spans of three or more years. 
• I 
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Thirteen of the unannexed SID's had warrant costs for seven or 
more years, and in these cases the interest cost averaged 12.4 per-
cent of total registered warrant costs. Of the 14 SID's which were 
active from four to six years, interest costs were 14.6 percent of 
total warrant costs. The percentage drops for the remaining 27 SID's 
(those active for three or less years). In the latter cases, interes~ 
was 8.5 percent of the total value of warrants. 
The data show that unannexed SID's are leaving their warrants 
unpaid for a longer period of time than those which have been annexed 
If these SID's should be annexed, they would pass an even greater 
interest burden from warrants on to Omaha taxpayers. 
A detailed picture of interest costs and warrant life by SID 
is presented in Appendix E. 
Conclusions. 
The following conclusions and observations can be drawn from 
the foregoing analysis of the fiscal structure of SID's: 
1. The debt associated with both annexed and unannexed 
SID's in Douglas and Sarpy Counties is large. 
This, in itself, does not indict the efficiency of the SID 
mechanism. Many of the SID's have high debt ratios because the 
cities requested expenditures for the development of parks, wider 
streets, and other amenities which serve other areas of the respective 
cities. In the case of Omaha, the City requested a championship golf[ 
course in the Applewood SID and got it; similarly, Omaha requested 
an indoor swimming pool in the Montclair SID and got it. As a result, 
the debt for the respective SID's rose. Many other instances can be 
cited, including outsize storm sewers, wider streets and larger parksJ 
all of which have driven up the cost of development. Further, several 
of the SID's annexed in the past have had unfavorable debt ratios, 
but were annexed to pick up the sales tax revenue associated with 
the commercial establishments in the development. 
2. The bonded debt ratio for annexed SID's in Omaha is 
substantially higher than the ratio for the City-proper. 
This, combined with the fact that the annexed SID's in Omaha 
could not pay off their debt under the City formula of 9.5 mills 
for debt retirement applied against the current assessed value of 
those SID's, calls into question the wisdom of past annexation 
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decisions. Conversely, the data lend substantial support to Mayor I 
Zorinsky' s "go slow" policy on further SID annexations. I 
il 
3. The available evidence indicates that SID administrative 
costs are excessively high. 
Some of these higher costs might be justified on the basis of 
the extra attention the engineers, lawyers, and bond houses have 
to give SID matters because of the lack of know-how within the 
SID board of trustees. Also, the ability of the engineers, lawyers 
and bond houses to respond quickly to SID needs has a certain price. 
However, none of these factors would appear to justify completely 
the difference between these costs to SID's and those of the City 
of Omaha for essentially similar work. Nor do they explain or 
justify the wide range of such costs among the SID's themselves. 
The data clearly indicate a need for better oversight of these costs 
on the part of the appropriate public authority and/or the provision 
of an alternative source from which SID's may obtain these admin-
istrative services, such as the municipal or county governments 
within whose jurisdiction they lay. 
4. More effective control is needed over the division by 
SID's of improvement costs between special assessment 
and general obligation financing. 
Although the data CAUR was able to assemble is not conclusive, 
it does show a tendency for SID's to allocate a greater share of 
improvements costs to general obligation financing than qoes the 
City of Omaha, for example. As pointed out in conclusion No. 3 
Chapter One, this tendency is due in part to the structure of 
the SID law which encourages developers to shift improvement 
costs away from special assessment financing and into general 
obligation financing. This tendency is, however, due also in part 
to the fact that what constitutes a legitimate general obligation 
cost from the viewpoint of the SID may well be considered a special 
benefit to properties within the SID from the viewpoint of the city 
or county government within whose jurisdiction the SID lays. From 
the viewpoint of the residents within an SID, for example, a tennis 
court for the use of all residents within the SID may legitimately 
be considered a general obligation cost. From the viewpoint of the 
city or county as a whole, however, the tennis court would be 
viewed as a special benefit for the residents of the SID whose cost 
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should be specially assessed against the benefited properties. 
5. The available data indicate that the 1974 amendment to 
the SID law requiring the election of two board of 
trustee members from resident property owners in the 
SID at the first election after the SID is five years 
old is not effective in accomplishing its purpose. 
The purpose of this amendment was to give resident property 
owners in SID's a voice in SID affairs. However, the data presented 
in the section of this Chapter on SID expenditure patterns demon-
strate that, in the large majority of cases, by the end of the 
fifth year the important decisions with respect to the SID's devel-
opment have already been made. Thus, resident membership on the 
board of trustees beginning the sixth year of the SID's life is too 
late to give resident property owners an effective voice in the 
important decisions regarding the SID. 
6. SID general obligation debt could be reduced substantially 
by requiring SID's to pay warrant interest and warrant 
and bond marketing fees out of general tax revenues. 
The data presented in the section of this Chapter on the 
financing costs of SID's indicate this reduction could be as much 
as 20 percent of the SID's general obligation debt. Admittedly, 
such a requirement would increase the financial burden on the devel-
oper in the early stages of the development since the property tax 
mill levy would have to be substantially higher than under present 
requirements and the developer owns most of the property in the 
SID during the early stages of development. But, surely, a viable 
enterprise can at least pay the interest and related charges on its 
development capital. Moreover, deferring the payment of this 
and these fees permits the developer (sic, SID Board of Trustees) to 
transfer the responsibility for paying them from himself to home 
buyers in the SID and, if the SID is annexed by a municipality, to 
the taxpayers of that municipality. 
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Chapter III 
VIEWS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE SID PROCESS 
An important part of any activity is how participants in the 
activity view it. Accordingly, CAUR conducted a series of in-depth 
interviews of the major participants in the SID development process: 
developers, contractors, bond houses, attorneys, City officials, and 
resident board members of SID's. The purposes of these interviews 
were, first, to ascertain the attitudes of the various participants 
toward SID's and their perceptions of the SID development process 
and, second, to learn about the inner workings of that development 
process. The information obtained from these interviews is 
summarized in this Chapter. 
Developer Views of the SID as an Urbanizing Mechanism 
CAUR conducted in-depth, open-ended interviews with twelve 
developers. Many of the twelve tended to view the SID mechanism 
as a blessing for all involved. They felt the SID was especially 
effective in aiding capital accumulation, lowering development 
costs and in creating more orderly urban growth. Nearly every 
developer believed that without SID's there would have been little 
or no growth west of Omaha's 72nd Street. They pointed out that 
there is open, developable land in and around Council Bluffs much 
closer and more convenient to Omaha's central business district 
than was the land developed in recent years in West Omaha. The 
land around Council Bluffs, however, has not been extensively 
urbanized because large amounts of front-end money are required 
for development in Iowa where nothing comparable to Nebraska's 
SID mechanism exists. It was also noted that the ease of capital 
accumulation allowed the SID to install high-quality improvements. 
Most developers believed that the SID mechanism reduces the costs 
of development, but they were not of one mind when it came to the 
processes by which this occurs. Some held that the ease of capital 
accumulation (actually, eliminating the need to borrow front-end 
money) permits tract development on a large enough scale to keep 
the cost per unit of housing lower than in a non-SID development. 
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Supporters of this view, however, were not able to muster any hard 
evidence to demonstrate the validity of the proposition. Others 
suggested that the ease of capital accumulation gives incentive to 
numerous small developers who, owing to the difficulty of obtaining 
appropriate quantities of front-end money, would not normally be 
in the housing construction market. The resulting competition 
reduces the average price per home. Again, no hard evidence was 
made available to support this opinion. There was general agreement 
among developers that the cost of money to an SID developer through 
the use of tax exempt warrants and bonds helps to keep development 
costs lower than they would be in a non-SID operation. Notwith-
standing this argument, those developers who had been involved in 
non-SID developments in Nebraska and other states felt that SID 
costs are higher than those in non-SID developments because the 
developer has no incentive to cut costs when they are being paid 
out of tax revenues. Here again no evidence was produced to 
verify the claim. 
Another reason developers felt that SID homes are cheaper 
than non-SID homes lies in the fact that development costs are 
assigned to taxes on an SID house instead of being included in the 
purchase price of the house; the normal situation in non-SID develop-
ments. The home buyer in an SID is able to deduct these property 
taxes from his income tax. In the non-SID tract the home buyer has 
to borrow not only the price of the house itself but also that 
portion of the total sale price which has gone into development 
costs. 
Most developers believed that developer control of the SID 
insures orderly development and produces results superior to any-
thing the city or other levels of government would be able to 
accomplish. In short, private enterprise can do the job better 
than the public sector. Developers then, retain complete control 
of the SID and the development process does tend to be orderly. 
Developers tended to see the disadvantages of the SID mech-
anism in terms of abuses and omissions or in terms of certain 
constituent groups receiving fewer benefits than others. Many 
felt they are being unnecessarily regulated by government agencies 
and misunderstood by both home buyers and the citizenry in general. 
.t 
lp-
-51-
Each developer believed that he ran a good SID, one that was 
sensitive to quality while keeping costs down. 
Each developer acknowledged that abuses have taken place in 
the operation of the SID mechanism but asserted that these have 
been few in number and all in the past. Abuses mentioned ranged 
from a developer's selling a ravine in the SID for a park and 
then financing improvements on the park with general obligation 
bonds to a recommendation by an engineering firm that an SID make 
an improvement which would have cost 22 times the figure for which 
the developer finally constructed the improvement. 
Some developers felt that in the past the City of Omaha failed 
to exercise an "educational" role in shaping SID's and that this 
omission led to abuses. The City was so anxious to add properties 
with high assessed valuations to its tax rolls by annexing SID's 
that it was willing to absorb far too many needless and expensive 
improvements which were "G.O.'ed" by the SID. Had the City rejected 
annexation of one or more of the profligate SID's, the fiscal 
responsibility of all SID's would have improved sharply according 
to some developers. 
Regarding the Cavanaugh Amendments (LB 313) ,.!.!/ more than 
half of the developers thought the amendment requiring ~larrants to 
be paid off in three years (operation and maintenance) or five 
years (capital outlays) is an acceptable limitation. This simply 
means floating bonds to pay off warrants which for the most part 
are held or backed by bond houses anyway. Most developers, 
however, said that requiring bonds to mature commencing not more 
than two years from the date of issue would kill the SID as a 
development mechanism. More than two years are required, under 
14/The following question was asked all interviewees (see 
Appendix F): Senator Cavanaugh's bill LB 313 suggests a number of 
changes in the SID law. What will be the impact on SID operations 
from the following amendments: 
A. Requiring warrants to be paid off in three years (operation 
and maintenance) or five years (capital outlays)? 
B. Requiring bonds to mature in equal installments commencing 
not more than two years from the date of issue? 
c. Permitting SID's to enter into joint projects with other 
SID's? 
D. County approval of recreation projects if not within the 
City's jurisdiction? 
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normal market conditions, to build a sufficient tax base within 
the SID. Failing this base the taxes levied on the undeveloped 
property would be exorbitant. 
Developers felt that joint SID recreational projects would be 
a good idea. The process could, for example, produce a larger 
park tailored to the needs of all citizens of the annexing munici-
pality. Developers also felt that county approval of recreational 
projects is acceptable but they questioned a county's capacity to 
deal adequately with this kind of problem. 
Views of Contractors Involved in SID's 
Telephone interviews were conducted with nine construction 
firms known to have completed work for SID's. The views expressed 
by these nine contractors are summarized in this section. 
The contractors interviewed expressed the belief that developers 
are the recipients of most of the advantages offered by the SID 
mechanism. Mentioned most frequently was the developer's ease of 
accumulating capital through the warrant and bond processes. This 
ease of capital accumulation, most contractors maintained, allows 
the developer to provide large-scale, high-quality improvements 
which would be impossible without such a mechanism. One contractor 
pointed out, "Iowa does not have such a mechanism and this has 
really had the effect of preventing development in the Council 
Bluffs area." Other advantages mentioned by the contractors were 
(1) the placement of control closer to those most affected by the 
decisions made, and (2) the lower development costs brought about 
by the ease of capital accumulation. 
The contractors were not pleased with their experiences in 
converting into working capital warrants received for work performed 
in SID's. Most of the contractors interviewed had in their 
possession what they considered to be "bad warrants." One contrac-
tor was holding approximately $500,000 in warrants that were at 
least six months old. Another stated that he was holding a warrant 
for work done over nine years ago. 15 / In order to minimize the 
risk involved, all of the contractors interviewed stated they have 
lS/Notwithstanding the fact that warrants are intended to 
provide interim financing, there is no statutory requirement 
limiting their duration. 
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started doing some type of investigation prior to contracting for 
SID work. These investigations are limited to conversations with 
project engineers, attorneys, developers and bond houses. One 
contractor was convinced that such investigations would become more 
intense if the warrant problem continues. Some of the contractors 
interviewed expressed the wish that pre-arrangement of financing 
be written into contracts. Yet, those who claimed to have had 
problems converting warrants into working capital have not adjusted 
their bids to cover such a risk, saying that SID projects consti-
tute a large portion of the work currently available and that 
their investigations minimize the risk involved. 
Aside from the warrant problem, the contractors thought that 
additional abuses exist in the SID concept--for example, the 
"questionable" integrity of certain developers. " ... They put 
things through that are not really beneficial to property owners. 
For example, a developer might sell a parcel of land to the SID 
to be developed into a golf course. Oftentimes the selling price 
is exorbitant, and the land isn't really suitable for a golf course 
or anything else." It was also stated that SID's often make 
unnecessary improvements knowing the SID will soon be annexed and 
that the City will assume the debt. One view was that certain 
developers are "taking money off the top." When asked if this was 
a common abuse, the reply was, " ... this was happening a lot more 
than one may think." 
Generally, contractors claimed that the SID concept is 
basically good, but there is substantial room for improvement. 
"The law needs more teeth," one contractor remarked. Others 
suggested the formation of a committee with representatives from 
all the parties involved in the SID development. Included in 
changes suggested by contractors to make the SID mechanism more 
effective were the need for tighter control and for the establish~ 
ment of an agency to oversee SID projects. 
Views of Bond House Representatives Involved with the SID Process 
Representatives of two Omaha-based bond houses were interviewed 
relative to their SID activities. Neither bond house relies on 
SID's for a major portion of its business. One indicated that SID 
warrants and bonds comprise only about 12 percent of its total 
"" 
16/ business volume.--
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The bond house representatives cited several advantages of the 
SID mechanism: 
1. Promotes Orderly, High-Quality Growth. The SID mechanism 
has made possible the orderly development of the Omaha 
urban area in accordance with overall plans. It has also 
proven to be a flexible instrument for the provision of 
regional facilities such as major traffic streets, sanitary 
trunk sewer lines, recreational facilities, etc. 
2. Facilitates Expansion of the City. One bond house repre-
sentative asserted, "Omaha wouldn't be west of 72nd Street 
if it hadn't been for the SID mechanism." The SID 
mechanism has allowed the City of Omaha to expand without 
having to make an immediate and direct financial contri-
bution to the construction of streets, sanitary sewers, 
parks and other physical facilities. The annexation of 
SID's after all improvements are made eliminates the 
necessity for annual City appropriations (and/or bond 
elections) for capital expenditures in areas outside the 
City or in newly-annexed areas. Moreover, it has allowed 
the City to see beforehand what it would be annexing and, 
thus, be better able to decide whether or not it wanted 
to annex specific developments. 
3. Expedites the Development Process. The SID mechanism, 
working through private enterprise, has much less red tape 
and delay than does the City. The SID's private engineer 
one bond house representive asserted, can complete the 
engineering design and specifications for a development 
nine months to one and one-half years sooner than could 
the City of Omaha's Public Works Department. Payments 
to contractors and others can be made in 10 to 15 days, 
compared to the City's 60-day average. The representatives 
also felt that SID costs overall were as low or lower 
than City costs. 
4. Provides New Source of Financing for Urban Development. 
The representatives felt that the capability of the SID 
to tap the tax-exempt municipal bond market was of crucial 
importance. Without this capability, developers would 
have access to very limited financial sources, and devel-
opment would have to proceed on a small scale, piece-meal 
basis. 
Discussing disadvantages in the SID operation the bond house 
representatives tended to act as apologists for the SID mechanism 
and to place the blame for problems elsewhere. "Bad publicity," 
~/In addition to expressing their views on the SID process 
which are summarized in this section the bond house representatives 
provided much invaluable information and data on the SID process 
and SID finances which were utilized in writing Chapters I and II. 
I 
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they asserted, was a basic problem. Developers who are not capable 
or who have "a piece of ground and plan on getting bailed out at 
the most profitable time" were viewed as part of the cause of this 
bad publicity. Basically, the representatives felt that most of 
the defects in the SID legislation have been corrected. They were 
concerned that if the law is changed too much and made too diffi-
cult, bond houses and attorneys would have to raise their fees. 
Cited by one representative as a disadvantage was the City's 
failure in its review process to insure adequate interconnecting 
streets between SID's. 
Asked about the degrees of influence participating groups 
have over SID operations, the bond house representatives replied 
that the answer depends on the stage of the SID process. At the 
beginning of the project developers and bond houses have the most 
influence (but not necessarily too much). Lawyers and City and 
County officials also have a great deal of influence at this stage. 
Residents have no influence in the early stages, but htis is not 
necessarily bad. They contended that the amount of influence each 
of the various participant groups has obviously shifts over time. 
Both representatives approved of developers retaining control 
of the board of trustees as long as there was development work 
still to be done, and went on to criticize residents of SID's for 
" ... not getting involved until something happens." They both 
declined to rank the value of the SID to participant groups. One 
did day that the developer benefited the most. The other stated, 
"Omaha citizens aren't hurt one bit." Another comment was that 
home buyers in SID's are now protected by the Real Estate Board 
policy requiring brokers to inform prospective buyers of the SID's 
mill levy. 
Regarding abuses in SID operations, the representative of one 
bond house felt all abuses of the SID mechanism were in the past. 
The representative of the other bond house stated that the only 
rec.ent abuses which have come to his attention were some instances 
where SID's had paid for parking areas in apartment complexes out 
of general obligation funds. 
The bond house representatives' response to the LB 313 proposed 
that warrants be paid off in three years (operation and maintenance) 
I 
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or five years (capital outlays) was negative. One comment was that, 
although it would help in the marketing of warrants, it could hurt 
developments and horne purchasers in some cases by forcing the SID 
to set an unreasonably high mill levy in the early years of the 
devleoprnent. 
The bond house representatives were split on the LB 313 
proposal that bonds mature in equal installments. One represen-
tative approved provided "equal installments" were taken to mean 
equal amortized payments and not merely equal payments on the 
principal. The other's view was that this would be an undersirable 
limitation on the financing flexibility of SID's; he cited as an 
example a developed SID where the residents recently approved a 
bond issue to construct a swimming pool. The SID's present general 
obligation bonds will be paid off in 1985. The residents, through 
their board of trustees, wanted the bond issue for the swimming 
pool to come due in the period after 1985 so as not to increase 
the present mill levy. This would not be possible if this require-
ment were placed in the law. 
Both representatives also expressed criticism of two other 
features of LB 313: 
1. The requirement that the minutes of all SID Board of 
Trustee meetings be sent to the City was thought an 
unnecessary cost-raiser. "What purpose would this 
requirement serve?" and, "Who is going to read all 
these minutes?' were the comments. 
2. The requirement that notice of all SID Board of 
Trustee meetings be sent to the City and County was 
thought to be entirely unnecessary, since notice of 
all such meetings is now published in the Daily Record. 
On how costs for a project under an SID compare to those in 
a non-SID situation, one bond house representative felt that SID 
and non-SID developments cannot really be compared because of 
differences in scale. Non-SID developments in the City tend to 
be much smaller and involve less extensive improvements than do 
SID developments. Interest rates on City bond issues are a little 
less than what SID's can get; over the years they have been about 
one-half percent lower. Attorneys tend to charge SID's slightly 
more than other clients because of the extra functions of a 
governmental administrative nature they have to perform for the 
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SID's. Costs under the SID approach are definitely lower. 
Construction costs, particularly are lower because under the SID 
approach the contractor is assured of getting his money promptly. 
Commenting on the need for guidelines to determine which 
debt should be financed by special assessment and which should be 
financed by general obligation, the representatives said bond 
houses tend to align with the City in favoring a high special 
assessment/general obligation ratio in opposition to the developer 
whose preference is for a low special assessment/general obligation 
ratio. The City and the bond houses like to see, as a rule of 
thumb, about 65 percent of total development costs specially 
assessed against benefited properties. Only the proportion of 
oversize facilities (streets, water and sewer lines, etc.) in 
excess of the normal size required just to serve the benefited 
property should be financed by general obligation. 
The following additional points were raised by the bond house 
representatives regarding the operation of SID's: 
1. No need was seen for the SID to hold public hearings. A 
better procedure would be for the SID to invite the 
"knowledgeable" people such as the developer, attorney 
and bond house representative to its meetings where 
important decisions are to be made in order to get their 
imput. 
2. It is very difficult to work with OPPD and MUD. OPPD 
demands payment before work is done, and MUD has a 
formula which is very difficult to follow at best. 
3. Residents are not politicians. They don't know what they 
can do and can't do. Residents just want to be informed. 
They don't really want to watch all the contracts; they 
don't have time. The "watchdog function" can be met by 
one resident sitting in on board of trustee meetings. 
Ninety percent of residents would be satisfied indefi-
nitely to maintain this level of participation. 
4. Homeowner associations are a good idea. They can feed 
ideas to the board of trustees and keep residents better 
informed of what the SID is doing and why. 
5. The bond houses would like to see annual or semi-annual 
interest on warrants. This could cut interest rates by 
as much as one percent. 
6. Omaha exercises greater control over SID's than does 
Bellevue. Major Zorinsky 'is "hamstringing" the SID's. 
City residents use SID streets, but the SID is given no 
credit for having provided them. 
• 
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7. An annexation agreement between the SID and the City 
(worked out at the time the City is reviewing and 
approving the SID's development plan) would be of great 
help in marketing the SID's bonds. {The North Omaha 
Industrial Complex has an annexation agreement with the 
City.) 
Views of Attorneys Involved in the SID Process 
This section presents the views of four attorneys who are 
serving as legal counsel for SID's, plus the views of one of the 
bond attorneys. 
The advantages of the SID concept of development as perceived 
by attorneys are similar to those expressed by other participant 
groups--that is, the primary advantages of SID's relate to the 
nature of their financing. The use of tax-exempt instruments 
(warrants and bonds) enables the developer to get needed capital 
for improvements at lower interest rates than conventional financing. 
This has several consequences according to the attorneys. One is 
that is permits the smaller developer to enter the housing market, 
which results in increased competition and, thus, produces lots at 
a lower cost per lot. The saving to the developer results in 
higher quality developments; developments are larger, more orderly, 
and there is less need for the developer to cut corners on 
improvements. Another is that if developers had to finance the 
installation of improvements there would be a tendency to do no 
more than the minimum required and future needs would not be 
adequately planned. But, by being able to pass along the cost of 
these general benefit improvements through general obligation 
(G.O.) taxes--rather than raising the price of each lot and thus 
being more likely to affect sales adversely--the developer is 
willing to install improvements for the future. 
The attorneys claimed that other governmental entities are 
unable and/or not interested in providing such services as roads, 
sewers, recreational facilities, and utilities to newly developing 
areas. Nebraska counties--reflecting the rural nature of the state, 
both today and in the post-World war II era when the SID legislation 
was passed--have been quite limited in their ability to provide 
urban facilities. The City is constrained by financial problems, 
debt limit requirements, and inadequate expertise and/or vision to 
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to provide facilities outside its corporate limits. Where a city 
is willing to annex vacant land and install facilities (e.g., 
Lincoln) according to one attorney, SID's are rarely used. 
The attorneys did not perceive any current disadvantages or 
problems, contending that legislation in recent years has eliminated 
the abusive practices of a small minority of developers. One 
attorney suggested that residents currently are not as informed as 
they should be about the SID's purpose and operation. Another 
suggested that residents be brought into the picture earlier, while 
still another said he was opposed to increasing the power of the 
residents over SID operations because they do not have as much 
financial investment involved as the developer. 
The views expressed by SID attorneys about the influence of 
the developers in the SID process were either a defense of the 
developers' influence on the grounds that it is their money and 
initiative which is responsible for the SID and development or a 
denial that developers have power. Several attorneys stated that 
the developers' actions are now closely controlled by the City--
e.g., their subdivision plats, engineering plans, recreational 
facilities, and assessment ratios must be approved by the City. 
Regarding the influence of City officials, the attorneys 
tended to stress that it was considerable and at times a burden to 
the development process. For instance, one attorney noted that 
conflict between City departments was so great that developers 
began requesting City Council approval of agreements between them 
and a City department. This insured there would be a formal commit-
ment by the City government to the terms of the agreement. The 
Zorinsky Administration in Omaha was credited with the creation of 
an interdepartmental committee to insure that the administration 
speaks with a single voice. One attorney termed the City's 
influence the biggest hurdle facing the developer in the develop-
ment process. On the other hand, most either considered the City's 
influence appropriate or indicated they could live with it. 
Several attorneys accused the City of Omaha of being at least 
partially responsible for past problems associated with SID's. 
They pointed out that the City has sole discretion to decide 
whether an SID should be annexed, and that some of the high costs I 
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and subsequent debt absorbed by the City were due to their own 
requirements. Several specifically referred to the rush of 
annexations in 1968 and 1969 which they attributed to a desire by 
the City to expand its total population count in the decennial 
census in 1970, upon which future State and Federal representation 
and aid would be based. 
The attorneys' views of the residents' influence on the process 
was split on some points. One attorney was sympathetic to earlier 
participation on the SID board at least for resident-owners, while 
another announced he was opposed to any increase in 
and a third thought their power was "about right." 
their power, 
The first 
attorney suggested that even minimal participation by the residents 
on the board would serve as a useful watchdog function, although he 
thought it would be more appropriate if it came after the completion 
of the construction stage (perhaps when the development was 20 
percent sold or filled). Several of the attorneys observed that 
resident participation is difficult to generate even when the 
developer desires it. Examples of this included not being able to 
find a resident slate when the developer wanted to give up control 
of the board, and only one vote being cast out of 350 eligible 
voters who had been notified by mail of the election. One attorney 
suggested residents would not be as critical of their SID if they 
participated in its operation, while another observed that when 
they had participated the SID was not as successful partly because 
the residents, not having as much money at stake as the developer, 
were less careful about costs. 
The attorneys related bond house influence over SID operations 
to the nature of the money market. When money is tight the ability 
of the bond house to influence SID decisions increases. In addition, 
the fact the bond houses are likely to be competing with each other 
would limit their influence. The attorneys indicated that the bond 
house becomes involved right from the first steps in the creation 
of an SID. In fact, one said, "Without the bond houses to make a 
market in warrants there would be no SID's; therefore their desire 
to make money has to be tolerated." Several commented that bond 
houses could be faulted for not exercising a tighter rein on SID 
expenditures. 
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Some attorneys are of the opinion that bond houses want to 
handle both warrants and bonds of an SID; therefore, public bids 
on bonds would not be possible. Although interest rates are 
higher for privately placed bonds than public ones, the private 
route allows more flexibility--e.g., there are no SEC restrictions 
nor required guarantees. The public system also has extra delays 
(therefore, extra costs) because the market conditions might not 
be advantageous for a bond issue, while with a private issue it 
is possible to get a commitment in anticipation of improved bond 
market conditions. Also, if the desired rate cannot be secured 
on a public bid, it is unlikely that it could be secured from the 
private market once it is known that the public bids were considered 
too high. 
The influence of attorneys and engineers in the SID process 
depends on their client. Some developers are easily persuaded 
while others are more independent of their advisers. Some 
attorneys viewed their role and that of engineers as merely following 
the law or expediting the development process. The influence of 
engineers was viewed as limited because of the supervision of 
their work by the City. The attorneys noted, however, that the 
relationship between the residents and the developer is frequently 
strained. Residents, more often than not, will replace the 
attorney when they gain control of the board, but the pool of 
experienced SID attorneys is quite limited so the new attorney, 
more than likely, has served other developers in other SID's. 
Most of the attorneys agreed, directly or indirectly, with the 
idea of a time limit on warrants. Some, though, questioned its 
advisability of time limits, citing the difficulty involved in 
predicting the future state of the economy or other factors beyond 
the control of developers (e.g., sewer moratoriums). None of the 
attorneys felt the five-year expiration date on construction 
warrants was long enough although one foresaw no problems for a 
three-year limit on operation and maintenance warrants. A seven-
year time limit for construction warrants was suggested by some 
of the attorneys. 
The attorneys said LB 313 ignored the consequences of not 
being able to pay off a warrants. Their concern was whether the 
result would be the SID declaring bankruptcy, or being forced to 
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issue bonds prematurely without an adequate financial base, or 
simply ignoring the deadline and letting interest continue until 
the SID is able to redeem the warrant. The dilemma here is 
reminiscent of the old adage of trying to get blood out of a 
turnip. The SID is already under pressure to go to bonds as soon 
as it can. Therefore, if the SID is unable to pay off its warrants 
because its assessed value is insufficient to support a bond issue, 
little could be accomplished by this amendment. Default on warrants 
or premature bonds are the anticipated outcomes according to the 
attorneys. 
Most of the attorneys were not in favor of level debt payments 
on bonds. Those that supported the principle felt that the require-
ment should not begin until after the fifth year of the bond issue. 
One suggestion was that the proportion of the debt paid each year 
should somehow be geared to the growth of assessed value in the 
SID rather than to equal payments. 
One consequence envisioned was that if this portion of LB 313 
becomes law there will be a heavy burden placed on early residents 
in SID's because they may have to pay off bond debts before there 
is adequate assessed value. A second consequence foreseen was 
that requiring bonds to mature in equal installments would render 
SID's useless as a development tool. It is too difficult, it was 
maintained, to plan costs because of the instability in the housing 
industry. Provision must be made, therefore, not only for 
"slippage," but also for "ballooning" of payments on the principle 
toward the end of the bond's life. Since no one can guarantee a 
builder how many houses will sell, no one can guarantee the success 
of equal installment financing. A third consequence predicted was 
defaults on bonds without adequate assessed value behind them and 
the issuance subsequently of refund bonds. The view was that 
legislated deadlines do not respect the money market; the maturity 
date should be determined by the market place, not by the will of 
legislators. 
Regarding how costs for a project under an SID compare to 
those of a non-SID development, the most attorneys felt that SID 
costs are lower than comparable non-SID developments although one 
opinion was that the overall costs of SID's are a bit higher. Some 
of the component costs (e.g., attorney costs), however, are greater 
3 
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in SID developments. One attorney remarked that this was due, in 
part, to extra functions performed--such as serving as the admini-
strative arm of a political subdivision. 
The same attorney also thought that engineering fees are higher 
in SID's,but that these are due to the ex~:a burden of authorizing 
all work by resolution which becomes the e~gineer's responsibility 
to draft. He also indicated that developers are less likely to 
drive as hard a bargain in an SID development as in a private 
venture. The other view was that engineering fees for SID's do 
not differ from non-SID situations. 
Some critics of SID's have claimed there are many opportunities 
for abuse. Has the SID concept been abused in recent years? Are 
there any aspects still open to potential abuse? When these 
questions were put to them, no attorney cited any area of SID 
operations still open to abuse. They generally believed there have 
been few abuses and the amendments to the SID law in recent years 
have curtailed the possibilities for abuses. One attorney suggested 
the City's earlier annexation policy was a virtual blank check to 
SID developers. Another questioned whether "abuses" may not be 
merely differing perceptions of what should be the appropriate 
public policy toward SID's. 
In explaining why many SID's have high debt ratios, the 
attorneys commented that for the data to be accurately evaluated, 
the debt forced upon the SID's by Omaha's request for added 
facilities (e.g., Applewood golf course, or Montclair's indoor 
pool) should be excluded. One of the attorneys called attention 
to the potential for additional development, in some cases, after 
the area is annexed and observed that residential areas generally 
show a less favorable debt ratio than commercial areas (most SID's 
are residential developments). In addition, he noted that other 
forms of revenue may stem indirectly from SID's--specifically, sales 
tax revenue--and do not appear in this debt ratio. 
Views of Omaha City Officials Involved with the SID Mechanism 
CAUR interviewed key officials of four City of Omaha departments: 
Planning, Finance, Public works and Parks and Recreation. Their 
views on the SID process are presented in this section. 
In early years, Omaha became involved in the SID process 
only when the SID was a subject of annexation. Now, however, 
I 
-64-
according to the City officials interviewed, the City is interested 
from the day the SID is created, primarily because of poor performance 
in the early years. An interdepartmental review committee to deal 
with SID's was established in 1973. The committee is composed of 
the Directors of Public Works, Planning, Finance, Parks and Recreation, 
Housing and Community Development, and the City Attorney. This 
committee now reviews all special assessment and general obligation 
financing decisions for all improvements (i.e., paving, storm and 
sanitary sewers and park and recreation facilities). 
The establishment of the SID review committee was prompted 
by the large volume of requests for the annexation of SID's coming 
before the City Council. Other contributing factors were the high 
prices SID's were paying for park land (the debt for which was then 
being picked up by the City when it annexed the SID's), and the 
fact that reviews and approvals of SID plans were being handled by 
fifth and sixth echelon employees. 
City officials were of the opinion that developers in the Omaha 
Area are not large enough nor is Omaha's rate of population growth 
large enough to support development on the basis of the private 
investment model. In some states--for instance, Colorado--private 
developers can easily manage development of subdivisions with all 
the prerequisites for "total" living, including golf courses and 
other recreational amenities. But this requires extensive private 
investment, a fast production process (e.g., 15 or more houses per 
day, and a sufficient number of buyers to fill the subdivision 
q,uickly. In Omaha, the small developer could not afford this sort 
of project and, because of Omaha's smaller population base and 
slower growth, even a major developer would find it difficult. 
"We simply have not had the growth in population to justify that 
kind of development; Nebraska does not have access to the financial 
resources--e.g., Texas oil money--that Colorado has," one official 
remarked. Without the SID mechanism, developments would be much 
smaller and this would hamper the securing of adequate storm sewer 
trunk lines, adequate park and recreational facilities, adequate 
school sites, adequate provision for traffic thoroughfares, etc. 
The City officials viewed the SID as basically a good instru-
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ment to develop land, and asserted that it is the only vehicle 
provided by the State of Nebraska which a~lows for the total 
development of an area including parks and recreational facilities. 
One official declared that without the SID it is very unlikely 
Omaha would have as much park and recreational space as it now has. 
The City's control over new developments on the private decision--
private investment model is hampered by the fact that it cannot 
withhold water, gas and electric services in order to force 
compliance with adequate improvement standards. These services are 
supplied by independent utility authorities--Omaha Public Power 
District (OPPD) and Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD). The 
City could, however, utilize its control over the sewerage collection 
and treatment system for this purpose but has never chosen to do so. 
Omaha has the authority to build roads, storm sewers, sanitary 
sewers, parks, etc., outside the City limits within its three-mile 
zoning jurisdiction. Again, however, the City has never chosen 
to do so. This would be controversial, and would likely have the 
immediate effect of raising the City's mill levy. A further 
advantage of SID's, according to the City officials, therefore, 
is that it is a painless way of getting adequate public improvements 
in new developments without having to go through City Council every 
time. Under the SID procedure, by the time these capital expenditure 
matters get to the City Council they have been transformed into an 
annexation question and have lost their identity as capital 
expenditures for areas outside the City. 
The City officials asserted: (a) without the SID mechanism, 
there would now be a housing shortage in the Omaha Area (instead 
of the current surplus) and rents would be substantially higher; 
(b) the SID concept has aided the development of industrial 
tracts in the metropolitan area; (c) installation of improvements 
through the SID mechanism, before the construction of houses, 
results in very substantial savings over what it would cost the 
City to install such improvements after the area is annexed and 
most of the homes constructed; (d) without the SID mechanism the 
development field in the Omaha Area would be dominated by a few 
large firms; and (e) most developers in the Omaha Area could not 
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borrow the necessary front-end money to carry out non-SID development. 
Regarding disadvantages, the City officials believed that the 
SID mechanism as it now exists will continue to cause economic 
adversity in building because it encourages over-speculation. They 
asserted there is a misuse of the SID vehicle in the development 
and financing of urban growth, and this misuse ultimately hurts 
the City. In past years, abuses did occur in the development 
process--although their frequency was probably low. There are at 
least seven examples where developers took unacceptable land 
(e.g., ravines) and sold them to the SID as park land. Another 
problem with the SID's is the division of improvement costs between 
special assessment financing and general obligation financing. 
Here, again, developer-dominated boards play a big role, and abuses 
are still possible today because of developer-dominated boards. 
City taxpayers, according to the City officials, have ended 
up paying for many things that should have been provided at the 
expense of the developer; these included such things as: 
1. Grading of the site, construction of internal 
streets, sidewalks, parking areas in planned 
unit developments, relocation of power lines, 
etc. 
2. Paying Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD) 
fees for water main extensions out of general 
obligation funds. The City has a case in 
court now to force SID's to pay these fees 
out of special assessmeqt funds, which is the 
practice in the City.12/ 
The City officials maintained that the developer's main 
interest is to develop an area and sell lots and houses. Many 
developers have no interest from that time on and do not look 
at the "total" living of people who will be there. In the early 
17/MUD has for years been authorized to build water and gas 
mains-anywhere in the Omaha Metroplitan Area. MUD also is 
authorized to set its own service limits. Developers who want 
water lines extended to their subdivisions have to lay "cash" on 
the table for the basis system of six-inch mains. 
MUD finances the trunk mains out of water revenues and builds 
the entire system with its own labor crews. Developers can do the 
same for gas or MUD would build the whole system and collect directly 
from home buyers through a combination of connection charges and 
gas rates. 
t. 
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years, the SID worked strictly according to developer preferences, 
and some past decisions are causing problems today--e.g., unsuitable 
land set aside as parks, swimming pools which were constructed too 
small, and areas where neighborhood parks and recreation facilities 
were not set aside at all. The recent amendments to the SID law 
have helped, particularly those providing that the acquisition 
and development of parks and recreation facilities have to be 
approved by the local entity of government that would be faced with 
the prospect of annexation. 
Developers, the City officials feel, have too much influence 
in the SID process, but LB 313 would force them to face up to 
their responsibilities; i.e., to levy higher mill rates and be 
more responsible fiscally. City and County officials have about 
the right amount of influence, but their powers should be written 
into the law. The City officials felt that establishment of 
the interdepartmental review committee has strengthened the City's 
ability to deal on par with developers. The view at City Hall 
is that bond houses, lawyers, engineers and architects have about 
the right amount of influence in the SID development, while SID 
residents need to be more involved. 
The City officials believed that SID abuses have occurred 
mainly on matters that the City wasn't able to control. Many 
abuses grew out of the anticipation that the City would annex the 
SID. This anticipation encouraged developers to be more extravagant, 
secure in the knowledge that the City would come along and pick up 
the tab. It also encouraged engineers to over-design facilities. 
This anticipation of annexation also encouraged bond houses to go 
along with questionable financing proposals. Such abuses, according 
to the City officials do not occur as often in SID's outside the 
City's three-mile zoning jurisdiction (and so beyond the prospect 
of City annexation), or in Sarpy County where most SID's have no 
prospects of being annexed. 
In the past, engineers, lawyers and bond houses tended to 
overcharge, but this is not as prevalent today due partly to the 
publicizing of several cases of overcharging and partly to the 
increasing sophistication of developers. Also, the City has 
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questioned engineering fees which seem to be grossly out of line. 
One City official mentioned that the special assessment/general 
obligation ratio is still out of line and the city does not have 
sufficient authority to control it. The City's position is that 
SID's should follow the City's policy on the SA/GO ratio. Mill 
levies should be adequate to cover the financial obligations of 
the SID. Yet, neither the City nor any other unit of general 
local government has authority to assure this. The City taxpayer 
has been the big loser; he has had to pay for much he shouldn't 
have had to. 
Steps to tighten the law should include requirements that 
SID Board of Trustees levy a tax each year high enough to pay 
both the district's operating costs and the interest on the debt, 
except at the inception of the district when there usually isn't 
enough tax valuation for this to be possible. 
The City must have and exercise the right to reject projects 
which it does not believe are justified, and to set standards for 
carrying out the projects. The City will have to assume the debt 
and maintain the project after the SID is annexed and, therefore, 
should have the controlling voice. 
development, the method of electing 
At some point in the SID 
trustees should be changed to 
give more weight to the ownership of homes and less to undeveloped 
lots owned by the developer. This might be done by giving the 
developer one vote only instead of one vote for each of his lots 
when the SID is, say, fifty percent filled. 
Regarding costs for a project under an SID compared to those 
in a non-SID development, City officials believed it is definitely 
cheaper to go the SID development route rather than the strictly 
private development route because SID's can secure capital at 
three to four points below prevailing interest rates on the private 
capital market. Construction costs in the two situations were 
judged to be about the same, while fees for attorneys and engineers 
were thought to be higher for SID's than for private developments. 
The City's basic objective with respect to the division of 
development costs between special assessment and general obligation 
financing by SID's is to insure that the home buyer in the SID pays 
the same cost which a home buyer in the city would pay. The City 
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Public Works Department does have special assessment/general 
obligation (SA/GO) standards--though not in written form--relative 
to streets, but none for storm sewers; storm sewers are financed 
totally with general obligation funds. The Public Works Depart-
ment's SA/GO standards are: 
Improvements financed through special assessments. 
1. Paving of residential streets (excluding intersections 
and drainage) • 
2. Sanitary sewerage collector lines. 
3. Site development costs (grading, landscaping, etc.), 
if the developer doesn't pay for them directly. 
4. Water, gas and electric lines. (City doesn't object 
to SID financing as long as costs are specially 
assessed). 
Improvements financed through general obligations. 
1. Storm sewers. 
2. Major traffic streets. 
3. Residential street intersections and drainage. 
One City official indica·ted he would be in a position to 
prepare written guidelines to aid developers in decision-making. 
These guidelines should, he thought, be written in the law rather 
than established as a City policy. If written as a City policy the 
guidelines would be too susceptible to changes in administration. 
Although the City possesses a veto power over all improvements 
made by a district when the SID falls within the zoning jurisdiction 
of the municipality, the City still needs more control over the 
SID process. The City officials indicated that LB 313 as originally 
submitted would provide the additional control needed over the finan-
cial arrangements of SID's. The following changes were also suggested: 
1. The public needs to be made more aware of the situation 
with SID's. "Residents don't have enough voice, but it 
is difficult to crank them in." 
2. For about one and a half years now the City has been 
requiring a financial projection of costs and bond 
issues. A funding plan for warrants should also be 
required. SID's should establish a mill levy at least 
high enough to pay the interest on warrants. 
3. The City needs to know more about what goes on in the 
0 
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SID Board meetings. It should receive notice of board 
meetings and their agenda, and copies of the minutes of 
all meetings. 
4. The City should see to it that all parks in the develop-
ment are completed before sales to home owners or, at a 
minimum, disclosure to a potential buyer as to what type 
of property adjoins his and what that property will be 
used for. For example, parks will be set aside and 
master-planned, but the potential buyer of an adjoining 
lot is never informed that he will have a tennis court 
right beside him. 
5. One City official would like to see the SID law changed 
so that at least eight percent of usable land is set 
aside for parks and recreation. The park set-aside 
should be approved by the City Planning and Parks and 
Recreation Departments, and the City Council. This land 
should be set aside at no cost to the City, its cost being 
added to the price of lots. (Currently it is being 
sold to the SID and financed through general obligation). 
6. The City now requires that land set aside for parks and 
recreation be approved by Parks and Recreation, but 
this is a matter of policy and needs to be written into 
the SID law. Without it being written into the law, there 
is no guarantee that administration changes will not upset 
the present policy. 
7. Written guidelines for the developer are not available, 
but they should be. These guidelines should be developed 
by the City Planning Department in cooperation with the 
City Attorney, Finance Department, Parks and Recreation 
and other City agencies. 
8. No municipal entity should be controlled by the people 
who stand to benefit the most from the entity--in this 
case the developers and the home buyers. The "sweetheart" 
nature of the developer--SID Board of Trustees relation-
ship is prone to abuse. The SID concept was originated 
by developers to help developers. This fact has to be 
kept in mind when dealing with SID's, and it has been 
the source of many of the problems with SID's over the 
years. 
The City's interdepartmental SID review committee (mentioned 
earlier) was ten to fifteen years too late according to City 
officials. If a review committee had been in operation some years 
back, the City officials believed it would have had the following 
beneficial results: 
1. More SID development costs would have been financed through 
special assessment and less through general obligation 
financing. 
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2. Fewer high-cost storm sewers would have been built and 
there would have been more reliance on open surface 
drainage. 
3. Some of the grosser abuses which occurred probably 
could have been prevented. 
The complaints of developers about the red tape which recent 
amendments have introduced into the SID development process were 
described by one City official as "a lot of baloney." He asserted 
that these amendments have simply brought the operations of SID's 
out from behind closed doors into the open for public scrutiny, 
and have inserted some checks and balances into the process. 
Two City officials declared that several unannexed SID's in 
Douglas County are in serious financial difficulty. As a result 
tax delinquencies and foreclosures can be expected to increase. 
In response to a question about what can be done to rescue 
financially troubled SID's and who should be looking after the 
interests of future home buyers in such SID's, the Oityofficials 
responded that the City was not the financial watch-dog of SID's. 
r,ater, however, they cited instances such as Happy Hollow View and 
Sunnyslope where the City did annex and, thus, bailed the residents 
out of bad financial situations. 
Views of Resident Board of Trustee Members 
Telephone interviews were conducted with 16 residents who are 
members of the board of trustees of their respective SID's. None 
of these resident members were developers. 181 Their views are in 
this section. 
Most of the resident-trustees were of the opinion that the 
primary advantage of the SID process is in the provision of 
lS/Some resident-trustees sought seats on their respective SID 
Board of Trustees in order to perform watchdog functions over the 
expenditure of monies and the levying of taxes. some ran because 
of their anger with the actions or failures of the developer. These 
included an alleged park "boondoggle;" poor construction and main-
tenance, and bills submitted and paid that were different than the 
bid price for work. Some were unclear why they had run and made 
such statements as "someone had to do it" and "the developer 
wanted out." Only one person ran on a positive program: to get 
more street lights. Four others gaveno response to this question. 
.. 
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financing which greatly reduces the developer's need for front-end 
money. A few of the resident-trustees saw "nothing positive" in 
the SID concept. Others were conscious of the need for local 
control of a local enterprise such as an SID development. 
Viewed as primary disadvantages were high taxes, lack of 
city services, too much influence by the city and the developers, 
and possiblities for abuse in the SID process. "The developer 
was ripping off the residents," one commented. 
Commenting on the success of their particular SID's, half of 
the resident-trustees interviewed viewed their SID as being 
successful in 
for 
serving 
keeping developer 
the board of trustees. 
the home owners. Several praised their 
the SID in the black and for working with 
A few, however, felt that the SID was a 
failure in terms of serving its home owners. 
Some resident-trustees thought developers, lawyers and engineers 
have too much influence over SID's. A few felt that bond houses 
and City and County officials also have too much influence. Most 
thought that residents have about the right amount of influence. 
Most resident-trustees thought the LB 313 amendment requiring 
warrants to be paid off in three years (operation and maintenance) 
or five years (capital outlays) is unacceptable because it is "too 
restrictive" and it will leave the SID in a "hopeless situation" 
trying to pay off large debts with a low assessed valuation. 
Some thought it was acceptable, possibly reflecting the fact that 
their SID has gone from warrants to bonds already so the problem 
does not exist for them. 
Most resident-trustees also were opposed to the LB 313 
amendment requiring bonds to mature in equal installments commencing 
not more than two years from the date of issue. As in the case of 
warrants, they felt this amendment would be too restrictive and 
that it would be impossible to meet the deadline. 
Resident-trustee views were favorable on the proposal that 
SID's notify residents of all SID meetings and that developers and 
realtors who sell property in SID's inform prospective buyers of 
the SID financial structure, including the district's debt and mill 
levy. 
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Conclusions 
In the preceding sections of this Chapter, CAUR has attempted 
to summarize impartially the views of the various participants in 
the SID process, and to refrain from evaluating the validity of 
those views. There are, however, a number of valid conclusions 
and observations which CAUR believes can be drawn. These are 
presented in this section. 
1. CAUR's interviews of SID participants revealed little 
adverse opinion with respect to the SID concept in 
general. 
The participants interviewed almost unanimously endorsed the 
SID mechanism in principle. With only a couple exceptions, the 
criticisms voiced were directed toward specific aspects of the 
SID concept or process, and not toward the SID mechanism as a 
whole. The only two criticisms which approached being wholesale 
condemnations of the SID concept were voiced by one City of 
Omaha official and a resident-member of an SID Board of Trustees. 
The official stated: "The SID is a bad law. Whenever public 
powers are given to those who stand to benefit most from the 
exercise of those powers there are bound to be abuses." The resident 
spoke of abuse of the SID process: "The developer is ripping off 
the residents. Fees for the attorney and engineer are too high. 
This is because the developer can pass the cost on and because 
there is nobody on the board to object." 
2. There was unanaimous endorsement by all participants of 
the SID as a financing mechanism. 
Developers, contractors, bond house representatives, attorneys, 
even City officials and resident-trustees all cited the SID's 
capacity for securing development capital as one of its major 
advantages. This perception conforms with reality; the SID is an 
effective instrument for financing urban development as had been 
pointed out in the earlier Chapters of this report. In this 
connection, it is worth noting that as of this writing, CAUR was 
unable to find a single instance of default on SID bonds in the 
approximately 25 years the concept has been in use in the Omaha 
Area--in spite of all the problems and difficulties some SID's 
have experienced. 
j 
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Because its value as a financing mechanism is widely recognized 
and endorsed, use of the SID mechanism is almost certain to continue 
in the Omaha Area. 
One aspect of the SID as a financing mechanism is worth 
special note. It was pointed out by several interviewees that 
the SID provides a means for financing the excess capacities of 
utilities, traffic thoroughfares, recreational areas, etc., to 
meet regional needs in addition to just the needs of residents 
within the SID. Although the City of Omaha has authority to 
build such facilities--or to participate in their financing--outside 
the City limits, to do so would require City Council action on each 
such proposal. SID's provide a convenient way of getting public 
improvements adequate for regional needs in new developments with-
out having to go through the City Council every time, with all 
the controversy and delay that procedure would normally entail. 
3. There was general recognition that the interests 
of developers and SID residents can conflict 
with the interests of the City and its taxpayers 
on the issues of SID mill levies and general 
obligation debt. 
Many of the participants recognized that it is to the advantage 
of the developer (particularly in the early stages of the develop-
ment when he owns most of the land) and, later, to the advantage 
of the SID home owner to keep the SID mill levy down. In fact, a 
low mill levy is a selling point for an SID. Yet, if the City is 
to annex the SID at some future date, it is to the advantage of 
the City and its taxpayers to assume as little debt as possible; 
hence, the SID mill levy should be high in order to pay off as 
much of the debt as possible before annexation. Similarly, it 
was recognized to be to the advantage of the SID residents and 
developers to finance as much of the development's improvements 
through general obligation bonds rather than special assessments, 
because it is the former than can be passed on to the City upon 
annexation while the developer and the SID home owners must pay 
the special assessments. 
4. There was general opposition from many of the 
participants to the provision of LB 313 
requiring bonds to mature in equal installments 
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commencing not more than two years from the 
date of issue. 
This opposition was particularly strong among developers, 
bond house representatives and attorneys. It involves two basic 
issues. The first issue relates to the requirement that bond 
issues mature in equal installments. If "equal installments" 
mean equal payments on the principal, this provision would 
require SID's to make higher total payments (principal and interest) 
at the beginning of the payout period because interest payments 
would be highest then. Consequently, SID's would be required to 
make the highest payments precisely when they are least able to 
do so. This would appear to place an unreasonable burden on the 
SID. If "equal installments" mean equal amortized payments (in 
which the proportion of each payment applied to the principal 
gradually increases over time while the proportion applied to 
interest gradually decreases over time), then this requirement 
would not appear to place an unreasonable burden on the SID. 
The second issue relates to the requirement that bonds begin 
maturing not more than two years from the date of issue. The 
major objection raised to this requirement was that bond purchasers 
prefer bonds with not less than a five-year maturation. Thus, 
SID bonds with maturations of two, three and four years would be 
harder to sell, and it would probably be necessary to raise the 
interest on them in order to sell them. This, if true, would 
appear to be a cogent objection to requiring SID bonds to begin 
' maturing within two years of the date of issue. 
5. 
Apart from some developers who considered this proposal, 
"an acceptable limitation," sensing its interpretation to mean 
floating bonds to pay off warrants (which for the most part are held 
or backed by bond houses anyway), most of the other participants 
viewed the amendment negatively. They argued that the SID is already 
under pressure to go to bonds as soon as it can. Therefore, if the 
r 
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SID is unable to pay its warrants because its assessed value is 
insufficient to support a bond issue, little could be accomplished 
by this amendment. One view expressed was that, in fact, there 
will be additional costs caused by going to bonds without consid-
ering bond market conditions, especially since bonds usually are 
not callable for the five years from the date of issue. 
CAUR's findings, however, as presented in Chapter II, 
demonstrate that most of SID expenditures will be committed in 
the first five years; therefore this kind of limitation appears 
reasonable. 
6. Most of the participants in the SID process think it is 
only appropriate that residents have no role in the early 
stages of the SID's development. 
Most developers believe that because crucial decisions have 
to be made regarding the development of the complete project, and 
because residents tend to think only of their own location, 
developer control of decisions is absolutely necessary in the early 
stages of development. They argue that it is their investment and 
they should, therefore, have control. The view changes when looked 
at from the standpoint of those residents living in unfilled SID's 
or stuck with the task of paying off large debts incurred in the 
early stages of development. CAUR's general finding from inter-
views with the resident board members confirms the developers' 
reasoning; i.e., many residents are committed to keeping their 
taxes down and assuring development only of their own section of 
the SID. 
At the same time, developers, bond house representatives and 
attorneys, for the most part, recognized there are positive aspects 
to resident participation as opposed to control of the SID process. 
Some of the positive aspects mentioned were that it would permit 
residents to observe the decision-making process and to understand 
better the reasons for decisions, and to provide a communication 
link between the SID Board of Trustees and residents. 
7. The opinion was widely held among the participants 
interviewed that the City has brought a lot of its 
present problems from annexed SID's on itself. 
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· There was general feeling that if the City of Omaha had done 
a better job in past years of supervising SID's some of the debt 
it absorbed upon annexing SID's could have been avoided. There 
was general feeling, also, that a substantial part of the high 
development costs incurred by SID's (ana subsequent debt absorbed 
by the City upon annexation) was due to the City's own requirements 
imposed on the SID's. There was widespread opinion, moreover, that 
these requirements were sometimes imposed arbitrarily. All partici-
pants, however, readily agreed that the City had very much improved 
its performance in recent years on all these counts. 
Although all participants were under the impression that the 
City of Omaha had formal, written standards for the division of 
improvement costs between special assessment and general obligation 
financing and other matters relating particularly to SID fiscal 
operations, CAUR was unable to find them. Not even the City 
officials interviewed were able to produce them. The establish-
ment in written form of municipal policies on these matters would 
seem to be a prerequisite to the consistent, even-handed application 
of requirements on the SID's. Furthermore, it would seem entirely 
reasonable to expect municipalities to have such standards in 
written form and available to SID's before municipalities are 
permitted to apply them. 
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Chapter IV 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
CAUR's analyses of the SID development mechanism and related 
matters presented in the foregoing chapters reveal several short-
comings of the SID mechanism. This Chapter presents CAUR's recom-
mendations for correcting these shortcomings and improving the 
effectiveness of SID's as a mechanism for urban development. 
Recommendation 1. 
The SID legislation should be amended to transfer the 
authority to establish SID's from the district court to the 
city council for the area within a city's extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, and to the county board of commissioners for 
the area outside the extra-territorial jurisdiction of any 
city. Existing procedures for hearings, recording and etc. 
should be retained. 
Justification. 
CAUR's investigations demonstrate clearly that SID's have had 
both immediate and long range impacts on tax rates and public 
expenditures in Douglas and Sarpy Counties as well as on the overall 
pattern of urban growth. The Douglas County Surveyor, for example, 
has estimated that Douglas County will have to purchase approximately 
$1,000,000 in additional equipment if it is required to assume 
responsibility for snow removal in SID's. It would appear logical, 
therefore, that the establishment of entities with such far-
reaching impacts as the SID's should be made the responsibility of 
the duly elected representatives of those cities and counties 
affected. As such, SID's would then have the attributes of an 
instrumentality of city and county governments, in the same manner 
as street improvement districts and many other similar special 
purpose districts now do, and the responsibility for their proper 
supervision would be clearly established. 
Recommendation 2. 
The SID legislation should be amended to authorize the 
city government within its area of extra-territorial juris-
diction, and the county government outside the extra-
territorial jurisdiction of any city, to review and approve 
y 
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not only the development plans of the SID as at present but 
also the SID's division of development costs between special 
assessment and general obligation financing and its annual 
mill levy. 
Recommendation 3. 
Coupled with Recommendation 2, above, the SID legislation 
should be amended to require cities and counties desiring to 
exercise the above review powers to adopt and promulgate, 
as the basis for their reviews and approvals,written guide-
lines and standards with respect to recreational, park, school 
and other sites for public facilities within the SID's internal 
improvements; the division of improvement costs between special 
assessment and general obligation financing; and the relation-
ship of the SID's annual mill levy to its total debt and 
assessed valuation. 
Justification for Recommendations 2 and 3. 
CAUR's investigations have shown: 
1. There is a definite tendency to over-use general obligation 
financing for the construction of improvements in SID's. 
Although in recent years the City of Omaha and the bond houses 
have been able to restrain this tendency somewhat, it is still 
a problem whose consequences appear in the large bonded debt 
situations in both annexed and unannexed SID's in Douglas 
and Sarpy Counties. 
2. As was pointed out in Chapter II, there is a tendency 
for SID Boards of Trustees (sic, developer) to keep mill levies 
unrealistically low in the early stages of the SID's develop-
ment. On this point the interests of the developer are 
directly opposed to the interests of the bond house and the 
city or county government. The developer wants to keep the 
mill levy low so as to minimize his outlay for taxes on his 
unsold lots and to provide a selling point to prospective 
home buyers. The bond house, on the other hand, wants the 
mill levy to be reasonably high in order to insure adequate 
revenue to pay off the SID's warrants and bonds. The city, 
also, wants to see a high mill levy in order to minimize the 
amount of debt the city must assume if and when it annexes the 
SID. The bond house has only the power of persuasion; the 
responsible city or county should have review and approval 
authority over the SID's mill levy. 
~ 
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3. In the City of Omaha, conflicting requirements are some-
times imposed on the SID's by different departments. This 
situation has been corrected for the most part by the estab-
lishment of the Mayor's interdepartmental review committee. 
Nevertheless, written guidelines for SID's should be provided 
by each city and county government exercising SID review and 
approval authority. 
These factors render it imperative, in CAUR's judgment, to 
give the appropriate city or county government this additional 
review and approval authority over special assessment/general 
obligation financing of SID development costs and SID mill levies, 
coupled with official written guidelines and standards on which 
developers can rely in planning and carrying out their developments. 
Recommendation 4. 
It is recommended that the SID legislation be amended to 
place a time limit of three years on the life of operation and 
maintenance warrants and a time limit of five years on the life 
of construction warrants provided at least 30 percent of the 
platted lots are occupied by residents by the expiration of 
the three year limit or at least SO percent by the expiration 
of the five year limit. In the latter case, the redemption 
of warrants should proceed with the pace of development (e.g., 
after three years for operation and maintenance and five years 
for construction warrants, outstanding warrant value shall be 
redeemed in proportion to the percentage of platted lots 
which are occupied by residents if that percentage is less 
than 30 percent or SO percent respectively). 
Recommendation S. 
The SID legislation should be amended to require redemp-
tion of SID bonds in equal amortized payments beginning not 
more than five years after the date of issue. 
Recommendation 6. 
The SID legislation should be amended to require annual 
payment of interest due on warrants. 
Justification for Recommendations 4, S and 6. 
The basic purpose of these recommendations is to inject more 
fiscal responsibility into SID operations while preserving as much 
as possible their freedom and flexibility of operation. The proposal 
in LB 313 to limit the life of operation and maintenance warrants to 
three years and the life of construction warrants to five years is 
l 
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basically sound in CAUR's opinion" However, it should be provided 
with a safety valve in the form of the suggested exception related 
to the stage of development so that unforeseen problems, such as 
recessions which may slow the planned development, will not put 
developers in an untenable posi tio:1" 
Requiring SID bonds to be redeemable in equal amortized install-
ments would modera·te the "ballooning" of bond principal payments at 
the end of the payout period while not forcing unreasonably high 
total (interest and principal) payments on SID's at the beginning 
of the payout period when they are least able to make such payments. 
It was indicated by one of the bond house representatives 
that the requirement of at least annual payment of interest due on 
warrant.s could reduce the prevailing interest rate on warrants by 
as much as one percentage point" Moreover, it would force SID 
Boards of 'l'rustees to set more realistic mill levies from the outset. 
Further, it would significantly reduce the amount of debt to be 
financed through bond issues by eliminating accumulated warrant 
interest from that debt" 
Recommendation 7" 
The SID legislation should be amended to authorize 
an SID to enter into an agreement with a city, if the SID 
is within the area of the city's extra-territorial juris-
diction, or with a county, if the SID is outside the extra-
territorial jurisdic·tion of any city, to perform all legal, 
engineering and administrative services for the SID. Such 
agreements should be permitted to include the city or 
county acting as t:he SID's agent in the sale of its warrants 
and bonds. The agreement should, among other things, 
specify the fees to be paid the city or county by the SID 
for the performance of these services. 
Justification" 
----
CAUR' s invest.iga U.ons have shown ·that the legal, engineering, 
and bond agent fees paid by SID's in Douglas and Sarpy counties 
are considerably higher than what. the City of Omaha calculates its 
costs to be for similar services on development activities within 
the City" SID's, therefore, should be given the opportunity to 
avail themselves of these services if they believe it would be to 
their financial advantage to do so. 
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Recommendation 8. 
The SID legislation should be amended to require each SID 
to issue annually a prospectus for potential investors in the 
SID's warrants and bonds, and home buyers, describing briefly 
the SID's development plans, estimated development costs and 
division of such development costs between special assessment 
and general obligation financing, and the SID's past and 
current annual mill levies, all as approved by the appropriate 
city or county government. The legislation should further 
require that the latest edition of this prospectus be furnished 
to the purchaser of warrants, bonds or property of or within 
the SID by the seller of said warrants, bonds or property, 
and that failure to provide the prospectus shall be sufficient 
grounds for nullifying the sale. 
Justification. 
Little or no information about the SID, its mill levy, financial 
condition and future plans is available to investors in SID warrants 
and bonds or to home buyers. Such a prospectus should facilitate 
the sale of the SID's warrants and bonds. This would compensate, 
partially at least, for the trouble and expense of its preparation. 
In addition, new home buyers seldom realize they are even in 
an SID until a problem arises. The Greater Omaha Real Estate Board 
has attempted to remedy this problem by adopting a policy that all 
realtors shall furnish information on the SID to prospective home 
purchasers. However, the effectiveness of this Real Estate Board 
policy is questionable since it lacks any kind of enforcement. A 
legal requirement is needed, backed up by penalties for non-compliance. 
Recommendation 9. 
The SID legislation should be amended to provide for 
greater and earlier involvement of SID residents in the 
governance of their districts. Specifically, it is recom-
mended that there be annual elections combined with two-
year terms, thus allowing turnover of the board in two years. 
Resident interests on the board should be guaranteed through 
one or more of the following methods: 
(a) 
(b) 
Granting the right to vote only to residents 
after some determined stage of de~elopment is 
reached (say 20 percent of the un1ts are occupied). 
Cumulative voting, thereby ena?ling the election 
of a representative of a minor1ty through the 
aggregating of votes. 
1 
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(c) Requiring that in the first election to be held 
after the district is 20 percent filled, that 
two residents be elected to the board. 
Recommendation 10. 
The SID legislation should be further amended to provide 
city and/or county representation on SID Boards of Trustees 
where 90 percent or more of the district is commercial or 
industrial. For those SID's, if the SID is within the extra-
territorial authority of a city, one member of the board of 
trustees should be appointed by the Mayor of the respective 
city. For those SID's outside the extra-territorial authority, 
one member should be appointed by the County Commissioners. 
The residency requirement established in Recommendation 9 
would be waived. 
Justification for Recommendations 9 and 10. 
CAUR's profile of SID expenditures indicates that the greater 
part of an SID's decisions on expenditures are made before the 
sixth year of the SID's life. Recent changes in the SID statute 
to give home buyers a role in SID decision-making, by requiring 
that at least two residents of the SID be elected to the board of 
trustees six years after the first election of trustees, therefore, 
are largely ineffective simply because most of the critical decisions 
are made before this requirement becomes operative. For these 
reasons CAUR believes that a more effective approach to giving home 
buyers an effective role in SID decisions, when it counts, would 
be to relate the board of trustee resident membership requirement 
to stages of development (e.g., 20 percent of the platted lots in 
the SID occupied by residents) as well as in terms of length of 
life. In this way residents would be assured of a meaningful role 
in the SID which develops rapidly as well as in the one that develops 
slowly. 
Although CAUR's analysis suggests that residential control in 
the early stages of development may be dysfunctional for the develop-
ment process, the residents do need to be on the board at an early 
stage. Having resident participation will allow the residents an 
opportunity to watch over the decision process, to gain an under-
standing of their SID, and to participate in the crucial decisions 
made during the early stages. Residents do need the opportunity 
to participate in determining what the future of their SID will be. 
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Recommendation 11. 
Municipalities should make more use of their authority 
to enter into annexation agreements with SID's. 
Justification 
One bond house representative stated that, in his opinion, 
an annexation agreement would greatly facilitate the sale of SID 
warrants and bonds, and might also lower their interest rates. It 
would, therefore, have considerable advantages for the SID. It 
would also have a significant advantage to the annexing municipality 
in that it would give the municipality greater bargaining power 
with the SID to secure improvements, etc., which might be very 
beneficial to the municipality and its citizens but which the 
municipality might not have the authority to require. Moreover, 
the offering or withholding of annexation agreements could be an 
important tool for guiding the municipality's long-range growth 
and development. 
Recommendation 12. 
A manual or handbook of SID procedures should be prepared 
for the guidance of SID Board of Trustee members and others 
involved in the SID process. 
Justification. 
The SID process, through the many amendments to the law over 
the years and the growth in procedural requirements, has become so 
complex as to be almost incomprehensible to the average person. 
Even lawyers have had to specialize in order to master all its 
complexities. Particularly in the Omaha Metropolitan Area, an SID 
procedure~ manual would be of great assistance to resident board 
of trustee members and others wishing to gain a general familiarity 
with the process. Such a manual, perhaps, could be prepared by the 
Homebuilders Association in cooperation with the City and County 
governments or under the auspices of the Metropolitan Area Planning 
Agency. The manual might well have applicability statewide; in 
which case the State Government and/or the State League of Munici-
palities might wish to participate in its preparation. 
APPENDIX A 
DETAILED SUMMARY OF SANITARY AND IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT LAW 
31-727, SID Formation. Sanitary and Improvement Districts (SID's) 
may be formed by a majority of the owners having an interest in real 
property within the limits of the proposed SID. The SID can be 
situated in one or more counties. 
SID Purpose. The purpose of the SID is to install: 
(1) electric service lines and conduits 
(2) a sewer system 
(3) a water system 
(4) a system of sidewalks, public roads, streets and 
highways, public waterways, docks or wharfs and 
related appurtenances, 
To contract for: 
(5) water for fire protection and for resale to residents 
of the district 
(6) gas and electricity for street lighting, 
To construct and to contract for: 
(7) construction of dikes and levees for flood protection, 
To acquire, improve and operate: 
(8) public parks, playgrounds and recreational facilities. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-727, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to purposes of SID: 
Provided, that sanitary and improvement districts located in any 
county which has a city of the metropolitan class within its 
boundaries or in any adjacent county which has adopted a com-
prehensive plan may contract with other sanitary and improvement 
districts to acquire, build, improve, and operate public parks, 
playgrounds, and recreational facilities for the joint use of 
the residents of the contracting districts. 
SID Articles of Association; For the above-stated purpose the 
majority of owners may make and sign articles of association in which 
shall be stated: 
(a) the name of the district 
(b) that same shall have perpetual existence 
(c) the limits of the district 
(d) name and places of residence of the owners of land in 
the district 
(e) description of the several tracts of land held in the 
district by these organizers 
I 
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(f) names of owners and description of real estate of those 
who do not join the organization but who will be 
benefited by it 
(g) the purpose of the corporation. 
Articles must further state that the owners of real estate in the 
SID are willing to obligate themselves to pay taxes which may be levied 
against all properties in the district, to pay special assessments, and 
to pay the expenses that may be necessary to carry out the stated pur-
pose of the SID. 
Articles shall propose the names of five or more trustees who 
shall be owners of real estate located in the proposed SID. 
No SID shall perform any new functions other than those for which 
it was formed, without amending its articles. 
Articles are filed with the clerk of the district court of the 
county in which the SID is situated along with a petition praying that 
the district be declared a sanitary and improvement district under 
sections 31-727 to 31-762. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-727, January 21, 1975: 
defining operation and maintenance expenses, capital outlay, warrants, 
general obligations: 
Operation and maintenance expenses shall mean and include, but 
not be limited to, salaries, cost of materials and supplies, cost 
of ordinary repairs, replacements and alterations, cost of surety 
bonds and insurance, cost of audits and other fees, and taxes: 
Capital outlay shall mean expenditures for construction of major 
permanent facilities having an expected long life, including, but 
not limited to, street paving and curbs, storm and sanitary sewers, 
and other utilities: 
Warrant shall mean a short-term interest bearing order payable on 
a specified date issued by the board of trustees of a sanitary and 
improvement district in anticipation of the receipts of property 
tax revenue, special tax revenue, or the proceeds of the sale of 
general obligation bonds issued by a district at a later date: and 
General obligation bond shall mean a long-term written promise to 
pay a specified sum of money, referred to as the face value or 
principal amount, at a specified maturity date or dates in the 
future, plus periodic interest at a specified rate. 
31-728, Notification of Landowners. Owners of real estate within the 
proposed SID must be notified in writing that articles of association 
have been filed in the district court. 
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31-729, Objections to SID Formation. Those not signing the articles 
of association may object in writing to the formation of the SID 
stating: (a) why the SID should not be organized, and (b) why their 
land will not be benefited by the improvements proposed. 
31-730, District Court. The district court approves the SID, elects 
the five trustees previously nominated, excludes real estate of 
those who prove they will not be benefited by the SID, excludes 
SID formation within a municipal corporation, and excludes tracts of 
20 acres or more outside municipal corporations if these tracts are 
used primarily for industrial purposes--unless the owner of the 
tract gives his written consent to its inclusion. 
31-731, SID Certified. The SID is to be certified by the district 
county clerk and sent to the Secretary of State within 20 days. 
31-732, SID Shall be a Body Corporate and Politic. The SID shall 
be a body corporate and politic called by number and county. 
31-733, Board of Trustees Duties. The board of trustees shall: 
(a) elect a chairman within 30 days of the formation of the SID, 
(b) adopt a seal, (c) record proceedings which shall be open to all 
SID landowners, and (d) appoint, employ, and pay for an attorney, 
engineer, and clerical help. The clerk shall receive a salary of 
$600 annually. 
31-734, Trustee Personal Performance Bonds. Each trustee of any such 
district shall, prior to entering upon his office, execute and file 
with the county clerk ••• his bond, with one or more sureties, to be 
approved by the county clerk running to the State of Nebraska in the 
penal sum of five hundred dollars •••. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-734, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to the amount of bond: 
•.•• running to the State of Nebraska in the penal sum of 
five thousand dollars •.•. 
Suit may be brought on said bonds by any person, firm or corpora-
tion that has sustained loss or damage in consequence of breach thereof. 
31-735, SID Elections for Five Trustees. An election for five trustees 
must be held within the first 12 months, and an election must be held 
• 
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each two years thereafter. Written notice of the election must be 
mailed to each landowner 15 days prio~ to the election. One vote 
may be cast for each acre of unplatted land and one vote may be 
cast for each platted lot. Corporations holding land may vote as 
individuals. 
31-736, SID Acquisition of Property. Within and without its 
corporate limits, the SID may purchase or condemn real or personal 
property for its corporate purposes. 
31-737, SID Power of Eminent Domain. The SID possesses the power 
of eminent domain over private property. 
31-738, SID Power to Acquire Right of Way. The SID may acquire 
right-of-way across public lands by eminent domain. 
31-739, SID Power to Issue Bonds and Levy Taxes. The SID may 
borrow money for corporate purposes and issue its general obligation 
bonds therefore, and shall annually levy a tax on the assessed 
value of all the taxable property in the district .... sufficient to 
pay the interest and principal on the bonds and for the purpose 
of creating a sinking fund for maintenance and repairing of any 
sewer or water system or electric lines and conduits in the district, 
for the payment of any hydrant rentals, for the maintenance and 
repairing of any sidewalks, public roads, streets and highways, 
public waterways, docks or wharfs, and related appurtenances in 
the district, and for the cost of maintaining and operating public 
parks, playgrounds, and recreational facilities. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-739, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to joint SID public developments: 
.... facilities, or, where permitted by section 31-727, for 
the contracting with other sanitary and improvement districts 
for building, acquiring, maintaining, and operating public 
parks, playgrounds, and recreational facilities for the 
joint use of the residents of the contracting districts. 
It shall be required to levy a tax to make up any deficiencies 
caused by the nonpayment of any speclal assessments. 
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The county treasurer is ex officio treasurer of the SID and 
will collect taxes. The county treasurer may collect connection 
and service charges upon authorization of the trustees, and shall 
dispense funds of the SID only on warrants authorized by the 
trustees. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-739, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to first bond maturation date and the prevention of 
"ballooning": 
Any general obligation bonds issued pursuant to this section 
shall mature in substantially equal annual or semiannual 
installments commencing not more than two years from the date 
of issue. 
31-740, SID Powers, Approval of Plans, Audits. The board of trustees 
of any district organized under sections 31-727 to 31-762 shall have 
power to provide for establishing, maintaining, and constructing 
electric service lines and conduits, water mains, sewers, and disposal 
plants, and disposing of drainage, waste, and sewage of such district 
in a satisfactory manner; for establishing, maintaining, and con-
structing sidewalks, public roads, streets, and highways, including 
the grading, changing grade, paving, repaving, graveling, regraveling, 
widening or narrowing roads, resurfacing or relaying existing pavement, 
or otherwise improving any road, street, or highway within the district; 
for establishing, maintaining and constructing and contracting for the 
construction of dikes and levees for flood protection for the district; 
and may contract for electricity for street lighting for the public 
streets and highways within the district, and shall have power to 
provide for acquisition, maintenance and operation of public parks, 
playgrounds and recreational facilities; 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-740, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to purposes and powers of the SID: 
••.. facilities and, where permitted by section 31-727, for con-
tracting with other sanitary and improvement districts for the 
building, acquisition, improvement, maintenance, and operation 
of public parks, playgrounds, and recreational facilities for 
the joint use of the residents of the contracting districts; 
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provided, that power to construct clubhouses and similar facilities 
for the giving of private parties within the zoning jurisdiction of 
any city or village is not included in the powers granted herein. 
Any sewer system established shall be approved by the Department of 
Health. Prior to the installation of any of the improvements pro-
vided for in this section, the plans for such improvements, other 
than for public parks, playgrounds and recreational facilities, 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-740, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to SID contracts and joint action with other SID's: 
.... the plans or contracts for such improvements, other than 
for public parks, playgrounds and recreational facilities, 
whether a district acts separately or jointly with other dis-
tricts as permitted by section 31-727, 
shall be approved by the public works department of any municipality 
when such improvements or any part therof are within the area of the 
zoning jurisdiction of such municipality, 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-740, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to SID plan approval by county board: 
.... municipality; provided, that if such improvements are without 
the area of the zoning jurisdiction of any municipality, plans for 
such improvements shall be approved by the county board of the 
county wherein such improvements are located, 
and plans and exact costs for public parks, playgrounds and recreational 
facilities shall be approved by resolution of the governing body of 
such municipality or county. Such approval shall relate to conformity 
with the master plan and the construction specifications and standards 
theretofore established by such municipality or county; (These two 
latter words constitute another amendment.) 
31-740, SID Audit. SID books will be examined by a CPA June 30 of 
each year. The audit shall be filed with the Auditor of Public 
Accounts by 31 December. The audit contents shall include: 
(1) gross income from all sources 
(2) amount spent for sewage disposal 
(3) amount spent for water mains 
(4) gross amount of sewage processed in SID 
(5) cost per 1000 gallons of processing sewage 
(6) amount expended each year for 
(a) maintenance 
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(b) new equipment 
(c) new construction work 
(d) property purchased 
(7) detailed statement of all items purchased 
(8) number of employees 
(9) salaries and fees paid employees 
(10) total amount of taxes levied on SID property 
(11) all other facts necessary to give an accurate and 
comprehensive view of the cost of carrying on the 
activities and work of such sanitary and improve-
ment district. 
31-740, SID Penalty for Noncompliance. If the SID does not comply 
with the SID audit provisions, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall 
appoint a CPA to conduct the audit. The fee becomes a lien against 
the district. 
31-740, SID Nonpayment of Sewage Service Charges to Metropolitan City. 
If the SID does not pay the city for sewage services, the city may 
sue or assess special taxes on the SID. 
31-740.01, Amending SID Articles of Association. The following process 
must be followed to amend SID articles of association. A majority of 
the board must propose the amendment. A notice of meeting to adopt the 
amendment must appear in a newspaper of general circulation. If no 
opposition occurs the amendment is filed with the County Clerk and the 
Secretary of State. The opposition petition, if any, must be signed 
by owners representing the majority of the front footage of real estate 
in the SID. The district court will hear the amendment motion and 
opposition. 
31-741, SID Contract Bids. Contracts for construction work of more 
than $500 must be let to the lowest responsible bidder on notice of 
not less than 30 days. 
31-742, SID Use Charge for sewer or Water Systems. The SID may impose 
a use charge on those served by sewer or water systems. 
31-743, Septic Tank Provisions. When a sewer system has been established 
in the SID, all septic tanks shall be dispensed with. 
31-744, SID Resolution to Make Improvements. The resolution to make 
improvements shall refer to the plans and specifications .... which shall 
have been made and filed before the publication of such resolution by 
the engineer employed for such purpose .•.. Such engineer shall also make 
and file, prior to the publication of such resolution, an estimate of 
j 
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the total cost of the proposed lmprovement. The proposed resolution 
shall state the amount of such estimated cost. The board of trustees 
shall have power to assess to the extent of special benefits, the cost 
of such portion of said improvements as are local improvements, upon 
properties found specially benefited thereby. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendme~~ to 31-744, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to special assessments: 
.... estimated cost. The board of trustees shall assess, to the 
extent of specral benefits, the cost of such improvements upon 
properties specially benefited thereby. 
31-745, SID Hearing on Resolution and Public Notice. The time and 
place of the SID hearing on resolutions must be given public notice. 
The last publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation 
not less than 5 days nor more than 14 days prior to the hearing time. 
31-746, Objections to Resolution. A resolution shall not be passed 
if a petition signed by owners representing a majority of the front 
footage is filed with the SID clerk. 
31-747, Trustee Compliance with 31-744 to 31-746. The SID Trustees' 
compliance with 31-744 to 31-746 enables them to make improvements. 
31-748, SID Letting of Contracts. Notice of a contract to be let shall 
be published the same day each week for two consecutive weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation. The notice shall state the extent of 
work, the kinds of material to be bid upon, the engineer's estimate of 
cost, the time when bids will be received, and the amount of certified 
check required to accompany the bid. 
31-749, Engineer's Complete Statement of Improvements. The engineer's 
complete statement of improvements shall be filed with the clerk of the 
SID within 10 days of acceptance of work. The statement is to contain 
the costs of improvements, the plat of ~~2 property in the district, 
and a schedule of the amount proposed to ce assessed against each 
separate piece of property in the SID. 
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31.749, Objections to the Engineer's Statement of Improvements. Written 
objections to the engineer's statement of improvements must be filed 
within 20 days with the board of trustees. 
31-749, Assessing Special Benefits. The cost of such improvements 
in the district which are within the area of the zoning jurisdiction 
of any municipality shall be assessed to the full extent of special 
benefits against the property in the zoning jurisdiction of such 
municipality. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-749, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to comparability of costs and assessments between SID and 
municipality: 
...• municipality, and in the same manner and to the same extent 
as the costs of such improvements are assessed in such municipality. 
31-749, Notice of Assessments. If the SID is within the zoning 
jurisdiction of a municipality, the costs and schedules of amounts 
to be assessed for improvements will be given to the municipality 
within seven days of publication of the engineer's statement. 
The amount to be assessed for improvements against each separate 
piece of property shall be given to each owne.r within five days of 
publication of the engineer's statement. 
31-750, Board of Equalization and Adjustment. SID trustees shall sit 
as the board of equalization and adjustment on the proposed assessments. 
31-751, Special Assessments. Special assessments shall be levied by 
SID trustees on all parcels in the SID which are benefited by the 
improvments. 
31-752, Exclusion of Property from Assessment. Nonassessable property 
in the SID is excluded from assessment EXCEPT where it has been 
specially benefited. 
31-752, Objections to Assessments. Special assessment objections are 
taken to the district court. 
31-752, SID Special Assessments. The board of trustees may find that 
any part or all of such improvements made are of general benefit to the 
district except that the board shall levy special assessments to the 
extent of special benefits to such property. 
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31-753, Special Assessment DelinquencJ for Property Holders. Taxes 
are due 50 days after the levy. After this, delinquent accounts are 
charged seven percent per annum. Such assessments shall become 
delinquent in ten equal installments over as many as ten years. 
31-754, Sinking Funds for Special Assessments. All special assessments 
shall go into a sinking fund to defray the cost of improvements. The 
excess, if any, may be transferred to other funds. 
31-755, SID Bonds. For the purpose of paying the cost of improvements 
herein provided for, the board of trustees, after such improvements 
have been completed and accepted shall have the power to issue 
negotiable bonds of any such district, to be called sanitary and 
improvement district bonds, payable in not to exceed thirty years 
and such bonds shall be payable serially with the first maturity 
not later than five years from the date of issue and bearing interest 
payable semiannually. Such bonds may either be sold by the district 
or delivered to the contractor in payment for the work, but in either 
case for not less than their par value. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-755, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to equalizing bond installments: 
.... serially and shall mature in substantially equal annual 0r 
semiannual installments commencing not more than two years from 
the date of issue •••• 
31-755, SID Warrants. For the purpose of making partial payments as 
the work progresses, warrants may be issued by the board of trustees 
upon certificates of the engineer in charge showing the amount of work 
completed and materials necessarily purchased and delivered for the 
orderly and proper continuation of the project, in a sum not to exceed 
eighty-five percent of the cost thereof. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-755, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to statutory duration of warrants issued for capital 
outlays: 
Warrants issued for capital outlays of the district shall 
become due and payable not later ·than five years from the 
date of issuance. 
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Such warrants shall draw interest at such rate as fixed by 
the board of trustees and endorsed on the warrants, from the date 
of presentation for payment and shall be redeemed and paid from the 
proceeds of special assessments or from the sale of the bonds issued 
and sold as in foresaid or from any other funds available for that 
purpose. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-755, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to statutory duration of warrants issued for operation 
and maintenance: 
Warrants issued for operation and maintenance expenses of the 
district shall become due and payable not later than three 
years from the date of issuance. 
31-756, Approval of Bond Issue. SID trustees must petition the district 
court to approve a bond issue. 
31-757, Notice of Petition. The clerk of the district court will pub-
lish the notice of petition. 
31-758, Unchallenged Petition. The district court deems an unchallenged 
petition to be true. 
31-759, Validating the SID and the Bond Issue. The district court shall 
examine the legality and validity of proceedings for organization of 
the SID and all other proceedings which may affect the legality and 
validity of the bonds. 
31-761, SID Spatial Enlargement. The SID may be enlarged by a petition 
of all owners to be annexed, or a petition of persons owning not less 
than 50 percent of the area to be annexed but not signed by persons 
owning all the area to be annexed. All property annexed to the SID 
is subject to all taxes regardless of when they were incurred. 
31-763, Annexation of SID's by City. When an SID is annexed by a city, 
the city obtains all property and property rights of the SID and is 
liable for all valid SID obligations. The city collects all taxes, 
and can maintain all special assessments. The city cannot change 
special benefits or increase any assessments made by the SID. 
• 
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31-764, Annexor's Challenge to SID Accounting. The trustees shall 
within 30 day.s of the effective date of the merger submit to the 
city a written accounting of all assets and liabilities, contingent 
or fixed, of the district. Unless the city or village within 30 
days thereafter brings an action against ••.. 
Legislative Bill 313, Cavanaugh Amendment to 31-764, January 21, 1975; 
pertaining to statute of limitations on SID liability for accounting 
to city: 
.... city or village within one year thereafter brings an 
an action against ..•• 
1974-75 
35% 
SID Valuation 
31 $5,748,620 
45 -
57 1,947,020 
62 412,360 
69 486,630 
73 2,600,875 
75 2,423,110 
81 26,645 
85 7,637,730 
86 547,635 
95 7, 380,460 
99 426,590 
100 358,680 
103 431,875 
106 918,500 
111 1,634,895 
113 923,880 
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APPENDIX B 
FINANCIAL SUMMARY 
UNANNEXED SANITARY AND IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 
DOUGLAS COUNTY 
December 31, 1974 
Registered Less Less Special 
Bonds Warrants Cash and Assessment 
Outstanding Outstanding Investments Receivable 
$400,000 $975,341 $330,641 $113,350 
100,000 86,530 20,286 -
285,000 13,440 88,721 930 
82,000 - 24242 -
66,000 22,364 17,607 8,451 
230,000 1,441 166,123 85,823 
230,000 - 56,643 3,908 
- 13,724 5,928 5,895 
- - - -
145,000 5,803 9,608 -
1,565,000 113,724 476,921 88,338 
40,000 5,005 2,526 731 
80,000 - 4,409 -
250,000 319,570 154,266 37,750 
65,000 - 20,771 10,519 
550,000 1, 718 54,942 2, 743 
190,000 - 16,740 -
.. J 
--< 
Net 
District Debt Ratio 
Debt (%) 
$931,350 16.20 
166,244 
208,789 10.72 
I 
60,758 14.73 
"' -.1 
62,306 12.80 I 
(20 ,506) (0.79) 
169,449 6.99 
1,908 7.16 
-
o.oo 
141,195 25.78 
1,113,465 15.09 
41,747 9. 79 
75,591 21.07 
377,554 87.42 
33,710 3.67 
494,033 30.22 
173,260 18.75 
Tn 
1974-75 
35% Bonds 
SID Valuation Outstanding 
114 $ 265,060 $ 31,000 
115 2,481,130 825,000 
116 1,807,515 544,000 
117 234,630 -
121 367,350 185,000 
122 1,751,195 385,000 
124 3,766,730 1,300,000 
126 1, 778' 930 690,000 
128 215,860 -
129 1,189,560 -
133 572,460 50,000 
134 670,530 -
135 505,300 135,000 
136 768,995 390,000 
137 531,610 108,000 
140 1,832,790 399,000 
142 2,499,735 1,800,000 
143 2,215,725 650,000 
145 429,545 200,000 
149 1,577,520 295,000 
151 29,665 -
APPENDIX B 
(continued) 
Registered Less 
Warrants Cash and 
Outstanding Investments 
- $ 27,535 
- 203,808 
$ 57,409 160,922 
161,557 14,546 
4,529 36,130 
- 50,674 
97 '707 412,999 
843,182 139,357 
93,419 8,450 
- 8,318 
- 10,311 
793,472 26,185 
3,034 27,225 
-
84,744 
- 31,291 
- 91,921 
- 291,595 
-
127,139 
98,594 60,723 
- 105,335 
184,974 5,427 
,. 
Less Special Net 
Assessment District Debt Ratio 
Receivable Debt (%) 
- $ 3,465 1.31 
$ 2,753 618,439 24.93 
- 440,487 24.37 
66,137 80,874 34.47 
20,296 133,103 36.23 
- 334,326 19.09 
91,509 893,200 23.71 I , 
"' 153,254 1,240,571 69.74 co I 
223 84,746 39.26 
- (8,318) (0.69) 
166 39,523 6.90 
- 767,287 114.43 
- 110,808 21.93 
42,400 262,856 34.18 
2,409 74,299 13.98 
7' 877 299,202 16.32 
46,978 1,461,427 58.46 
9,000 513,860 23.19 
13,116 224,756 52.32 
- 189,665 12.02 
46,603 132,943 448.15 
1974-75 
35% Bonds 
SID Valuation Outstanding 
152 $1,035,465 $ 565,000 
155 250,615 120,000 
157 759,825 -
158 1,398,320 258,500 
160 383,805 70,000 
161 272,300 490,000 
162 228,455 -
165 1,673,150 395,000 
166 1,959,130 1,050,000 
167 443,660 -
168 766,855 290,000 
170 35,430 -
171 3,452,595 500,000 
172 928,045 240,000 
173 
174 3,073,490 910,000 
175 819,325 -
177 1, 002,925 -
178 59,480 -
179 384,015 12,000 
182 5,537,180 1,000,000 
.. 
APPENDIX B 
(continued) 
Registered Less 
Warrants Cash and 
Outstanding Investments 
- $ 46,578 
40,963 32,093 
824,648 10,582 
625,442 131,765 
430 4,110 
1,007,675 378 
140,035 6,796 
25,320 63,125 
168,591 78,209 
577,565 1,366 
- 52,644 
9,811 3,200 
-
294,004 
-
37,337 
15,112 119,402 
-
54,299 
1,133,512 40,535 
-
1,665 
-
9,554 
1,329,682 727,159 
Less Special Net 
Assessment District Debt Ratio 
Receivable Debt (%) 
$ 22,816 $495,606 47.86 
5,820 123,050 49.10 
- 814,066 107.14 
36,987 715,190 51.15 
3,428 62,892 16.39 
- 1,497,298 549.87 
11,501 121,138 53.29 I ..., 
..., 
921 356,275 21.29 I 
22,713 1,117,668 57.05 
473,928 102,272 23.05 
-
237,356 30.95 
-
6,611 18.66 
23,309 182,687 5.29 
38 '775 163,888 17.66 
25,369 780,341 25.39 
7,396 (61,696) (7. 53) 
710,748 382,230 38.11 
- (1,665) (2.80) 
503 1,943 0.51 
362,621 1,239,902 22.39 
1974-75 
35% Bonds 
SID Valuation Outstanding 
184 $ 9,190 -
187 1,946,580 $ 650,000 
188 10,872,550 4,925,000 
189 4,023,355 1,125,000 
190 408,955 195,000 
193 730,670 250,000 
194 3,170 -
195 1,321,080 1,375,000 
196 1,098,420 550,000 
197 
198 830 -
201 31,845 -
202 916,635 275,000 
203 166,435 -
204 1,682,345 675,000 
205 1,078,675 325,000 
206 1,557,370 500,000 
208 35,820 -
209 2,810 -
210 160,170 -
211 
APPENDIX B 
(continued) 
Registered Less 
Warrants Cash and 
Outstanding Investments 
- -
$1,131,891 $ 29,349 
2,177,230 384,203 
978,487 145,401 
1,176 1,906 
- 90,759 
- 19,015 
224,637 350,837 
28,790 176,337 
60 30 
54,284 1,029 
-
122,964 
284,364 6,850 
14,730 (561) 
-
40,884 
1,654,003 111,112 
- -
- -
1,785,303 9,586 
Less Special Net 
Assessment District Debt Ratio 
Receivable Debt (%) 
- - 0.00 
- $1,752,542 90.03 
$117,524 6,600,503 60.71 
7,460 1,950,626 48.48 
13,544 180,727 44.19 
14,198 145,043 19.85 
I 
15,641 (34,656) (1093.26) .... 0 
526,331 722,470 54.69 0 I 
157,474 244,979 22.30 
. - 30 3.64 
-
53,255 167.23 
53,527 98,509 10.75 
35,440 242,073 145.45 
413,927 276,365 16.43 
- 284,116 26.34 
30,432 2,012,459 129.22 
- -
0.00 
- -
o.oo 
539,259 1,236,458 771.97 
1974-75 
35% 
SID Valuation 
213 $ 196' 480 
217 
218 20,720 
219 535,295 
220 4,450 
221 581,780 
222 2,404,010 
223 659,240 
224 2,373,545 
225 590,835 
226 89,425 
227 303,370 
228 716,655 
229 1,594,810 
230 1,399,770 
231 32,105 
232 10,775 
233 1,919,550 
234 34,975 
235 2,401,440 
236 775' 110 
• 
Bonds 
Outstanding 
-
-
1,100,000 
-
-
-
-
1,000,000 
-
-
-
950,000 
-
-
-
-
525,000 
-
-
-
APPENDIX B 
(continued) 
Registered Less 
Warrants Cash and 
Outstanding Investments 
- -
- -
1,484,013 291,518 
210,346 548 
733,855 8,253 
1,671,658 8,040 
226,042 10,032 
2,901,541 469,705 
158,892 4, 319 
140,557 222 
1,842,585 413,293 
539,858 136,436 
4,644,311 14,633 
1,871,846 33,753 
- -
257,488 4,307 
874,977 62' 313 
- -
1 ,924, 913 161,507 
4,168,671 20,087 
Less Special Net 
Assessment District Debt Ratio 
Receivable Debt (%) 
- -
0.00 
- -
0.00 
319,219 1,973,276 368.63 
-
209,799 4714.58 
-
725,602 124.72 
-
1,663,619 69.20 I 
.... 
17.86 0 98,282 117 '728 .... I 
1' 102,115 2, 329,722 98.15 
-
154,573 26.16 
-
140,335 156.93 
240,047 1,189,245 392.01 
548,648 804,773 112.30 
- 4,629,678 290.30 
-
1,838,093 131.31 
- -
0.00 
-
253,181 2349.70 
1,241 1,336,423 69.62 
-
- 0.00 
- 1 '763,406 73.43 
-
4,148,584 535.23 
1974-75 
35% Bonds 
SID Valuation Outstanding 
237 $ 341,950 -
239 74,940 -
240 730,395 1,200,000 
241 440, 785 -
242 991,395 -
243 100,380 -
244 40,110 -
245 38,540 -
246 4,920 -
247 347,960 -
248 14,655 -
249 143,755 -
250 1,675,340 -
251 12.315 -
252 57,965 -
253 5,610 -
254 49,140 -
255 422,540 
-
256 63,350 -
257 117.700 -
258 156,240 
-
APPENDIX B 
(continued) 
Registered Less 
lo/arrants Cash and 
Outstanding Investments 
$ 56,402 $ 13,730 
645,722 1, 839 
- 206,360 
1,923,887 6,113 
918,818 349,297 
1,257,399 10,137 
1,171,376 25 
259,168 -
316,896 63 
1,495,974 12,775 
142,540 7 
1,240. 300 14,868 
1,481,050 58,172 
371,818 45 
891,819 330 
950,116 57 
503,893 57 
150,640 3,267 
814,151 6 
4,137,265 923 
23,386 2,294 
Less Special Net 
Assessment District Debt Ratio 
Receivable Debt (%) 
- $ 42,671 12.48 
- 643,883 859. 20 
461,290 532,250 72.89 
- 1,917,774 435.08 
251,900 317,621 32.04 
- 1,247,261 1242.54 
I 
- 1,171,351 2920.35 ..... 0 
259,167 672.46 N - I 
- 316.832 6439.68 
- 1,483,199 426.26 
- 142,533 972.59 
- 1,225,432 852.44 
- 1,422,878 84.93 
- 371,773 3018.86 
- 891,490 1537.98 
- 950,059 16935.10 
- 503.836 1026.31 
- 147,372 34.88 
- 814,146 1285. 16 
- 4,136,341 3514.31 
- 21,092 13.50 
~ .. _ _, 
1974-75 
35% Bonds 
SID Valuation Outstanding 
259 $ 224,510 -
261 474,295 -
262 9,825 -
263 39,655 -
264 61,220 -
265 100,395 -
266 77,410 -
267 44,040 -
268 145,250 -
269 5,560 -
270 
271 29,480 -
272 27,165 -
273 18,760 -
274 
275 48,080 -
276 12,250 -
277 29,345 -
278 13,230 -
Total $133,743,105 $33,785,500 
a/ 
- Exeludes SID 45. 
APPENDIX B 
( eontinued) 
Registered Less 
Warrants Cash and 
Outstanding Investments 
$ 103,903 $ 316 
928,017 9,235 
94,946 -
137,008 114 
1,697,354 -
2,001,947 141 
156,403 104 
1,448,417 35 
669,271 2,875 
152,862 55 
386,770 -
1,928,005 -
32,141 -
53,942 -
268,962 -
- -
223,570 -
$70,817,972 $8,908 '716 
Source: City of Omaha Finanee Department. 
Less Speeial Net 
Assessment Dis tricot Debt Ratio 
Reeeivable Debt (%) 
- $ 103,587 46.14 
- 918,782 193.72 
- 94,946 966.37 
- 136,894 345.21 
- 1,697,353 2772.54 
-
2,001,805 1993.93 I 
156,299 201.91 ..... - 0 
w 
-
1,448,382 3288.79 I 
-
666,396 458.79 
- 152,807 2748.32 
- 386,769 1311.97 
- 1,928,005 7097.38 
- 32,141 171.33 
- 53.942 112.19 
-
268,962 2195.61 
- -
0.00 
-
223,570 1689.87 
$7,555,495 $88,139,261 65.#/ 
r 
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APPENDIX C 
AMOUNT OF WARRANTS BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 
ANNEXED SID'S 
Type of Cost 
Equipment Engineering and 
Total Construction And Service Legal Architectural Fiscal Other 
SID Amount Costs Cost Fees Costs Agent Fees Costs Total 
47 $1,775,085 73.8 11.6 1.9 6.3 6.2 0.2 100.0 
55 6,504 83.2 3.5 4.0 6.3 1.9 1.1 100.0 
59 749,457 80.3 9.9 3.2 5.8 0.0 0.9 100.0 
84 287,091 82. 1 11.4 0.0 3.2 3.3 0.0 100.0 
85 455,182 88.1 2. 1 1.9 8.0 0.0 o.o 100.0 
107 155 '086 81.6 4.3 4. 1 7.2 2.4 0.4 100.0 
108 46' 338 60.1 6.0 5.8 3.9 24.2 0.0 100.0 
120 45,002 80.4 3.6 8.6 6. 1 1.3 0.0 100.0 
127 438,378 80.9 10.7 3.8 4.4 0.0 0.2 100.0 
129 211,313 65.5 6. 1 5.5 9.5 7.8 5.6 100.0 
159 21,477 83.8 1.1 5.0 10.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 
163 133,007 65.6 7. 0 3.8 10.4 3.2 10.0 100.0 
164 34' 691 63.6 18.6 9.2 5.9 2.8 0.0 100.0 
176 22,720 82. 1 6.9 0.0 9.6 0.0 1.5 100.0 
200 55,983 67.6 6.9 9.3 11.8 4.4 0.0 100.0 
207 670,686 84.9 4.6 2.3 8.0 0.2 0.0 100.0 
214 160,960 77.7 0.9 5.5 9.5 6. 1 0.2 100.0 
215 69,408 72.8 5.5 8.4 13.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 
217 126' 886 78.1 0.7 4.0 11.2 5.9 0.1 100.0 
Total $5,465,237 78.0 8.3 2.9 6.9 3.2 0.7 100.0 
:al 
) .0 
J.O 
J.O 
). 0 
) .0 
).0 
).0 
) . 0 
J.O 
J.O 
) .0 
) . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
o.o 
UNANNEXED SID'S 
SID 
Total 
Amount 
31 $ 5,839,807 
45 247,347 
62 13,369 
69 90,463 
75 368,205 
81 17,346 
95 4, 725' 773 
128 131,894 
133 89,501 
135 172,598 
137 177,407 
143 617,411 
151 186,217 
155 96,003 
170 40,350 
172 198, 135 
179 62,624 
190 213,466 
191 130,592 
193 226,241 
199 133,738 
201 38,688 
205 
206 
210 
220 
223 
224 
225 
200,703 
1,563,181 
1,671,651 
82' 619 
237,704 
2 '943,384 
157,196 
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APPENDIX C 
AMOUNT OF WARRANTS BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 
Type of Cost 
Equipment Engineering and 
Construction And Service Legal Architectural Fiscal Other 
Costs Costs Fees Costs Agent Fees Costs Total 
74.5 
91.0 
19.9 
21.7 
87.3 
71.7 
82.4 
82.0 
58.9 
81.7 
87.8 
65.5 
59.5 
83.2 
63. 1 
70.1 
77.5 
61.6 
74.7 
62.7 
82.3 
66.1 
87.4 
77.7 
72.8 
74.6 
77.4 
83.3 
84.1 
4.1 
o.o 
56.0 
37.5 
1.2 
10.0 
3.3 
6.8 
2.4 
3.1 
1.7 
15. 1 
31.1 
3.5 
3.3 
7.4 
2.0 
21.8 
12.1 
11.3 
3.0 
2.4 
0.6 
3.1 
13.9 
2.2 
1.3 
2.3 
5.3 
3.3 
5. 1 
16.8 
7.9 
3.0 
4.6 
2.6 
5.8 
5.1 
5.3 
1.5 
2.9 
3.3 
4.0 
21.0 
5.2 
7.0 
4.9 
3. 1 
2. 1 
2.0 
9.2 
3.5 
5.7 
2.6 
5.6 
5.2 
2.4 
5.9 
8.6 
1.7 
2.5 
5.3 
5.0 
6.6 
8.3 
2.4 
4.1 
6.2 
8. 1 
5.9 
4.8 
6.3 
7.3 
10.0 
12. 7 
10.3 
10.0 
8.6 
10. 7 
22.3 
8.3 
10. 1 
7.4 
13.3 
11.5 
7.8 
0.0 
7.2 
2.2 
o.o 
o.o 
2.4 
o.o 
2.0 
2.1 
1.8 
3.4 
0.0 
3.0 
1.3 
1.9 
5.3 
6.0 
0.7 
1.0 
o.o 
4.8 
2.0 
o.o 
0.0 
3.2 
3.3 
4.3 
3.9 
3.8 
3.8 
2.4 100.0 
o.o 100.0 
4.8 100.0 
27.6 100.0 
1.1 100.0 
7 .o 100.0 
1.4 100.0 
1.0 100.0 
27.7 100.0 
o. 4 100.0 
0.9 100.0 
7.7 100.0 
o.o 100.0 
1.1 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
1.3 100.0 
100.0 
0.4 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
10.5 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0.1 100.0 
0.1 100.0 
100.0 
0.0 100.0 
0. 7 100.0 
0.4 100.0 
0.9 100.0 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
(continued) 
AMOUNT OF WARRANTS BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 
UNANNEXED SID'S 
Type of Cost 
Equipment Engineering and 
Total onstructio.n and Service Legal Architectural Fiscal Other 
SID Amount Costs Costs Fees Costs Agent Fees Costs Total 
227 1,662,006 82.7 2.4 2.3 7.4 4.8 .5 100.0 
228 1,276,989 79.0 6.1 3.4 6.8 4.5 .2 100.0 
229 4,049,559 85.7 1.3 3.6 5.5 3.9 .1 100.0 
232 371,936 77.1 1.0 2.3 15. 8 3.7 .2 100.0 
233 1,249,090 84.0 1.6 2.6 8.8 .3 100.0 
237 56,402 86.8 0.0 . 7 2.6 3. 7 100.0 
239 592,328 80.5 1.7 4.2 8.9 4.5 .2 100.0 
241 1, 757,662 83.4 1.6 4.5 5.8 3.8 .9 100.0 
243 1,216, 916 88.7 6.2 0.0 0.0 4.2 1.0 100.0 
245 259,168 80.2 1.4 3.2 14.8 0.0 . 3 100.0 
246 261,016 85.2 1.6 2.2 8.2 2.9 100.0 
247 1,501,760 83.5 .9 . 3 9.3 • 3 • 3 100.0 
249 1,170,278 88.0 2.3 2.4 7.3 0.0 100.0 
252 845,402 86.7 1.2 1.3 .4 3.2 3.6 100.0 
254 431,006 80. 4 1.7 5.5 . 9 3.4 .1 100.0 
255 150,463 92.6 .9 3.1 2.8 .5 .1 100.0 
256 772, 364 86.1 6.8 1.8 5.3 0.0 100.0 
257 3,237,995 83.9 1.3 2.3 8.6 3.9 100.0 
259 103,903 52.8 25.6 3.0 13.8 4.5 .5 100.0 
261 155,982 0.0 0.0 1.6 98.3 .2 100.0 
262 43,160 70.8 4; 7. 1.7 17.2 3.8 1.9 100.0 
263 72,280 66.2 15.1 5.0 11.3 2.4 100.0 
264 1,244,531 77.7 1.9 6.9 8.3 4.3 1.0 100.0 
266 111,469 81.6 5.0 3.2 10.2 0.0 100.0 
272 646,557 67.5 • 7 .1 28.1 3.4 . 3 100.0 
Total $43,853,835 80.2 3.7 3.1 8.2 3.7 1.0 100.0 
--less than 0.1 
tal 
). 0 
) . 0 
).0 
),0 
). 0 
). 0 
) • 0 
) • 0 
}, 0 
). 0 
} • 0 
}, 0 
). 0 
), 0 
} .0 
} • 0 
} • 0 
Q. 0 
' 0.0 
Q,O 
0.0 
Q.O 
0.0 
0.0 
Q,O 
0.0 
SID 
47 
55 
59 
84 
85 
107 
108 
120 
127 
129 
159 
163 
164 
176 
200 
207 
214 
215 
217 
Total 
APPENDIX D 
EXPENDITURES BY YEAR OF LIFE!/ 
1 2 3 4 5 
150,411 441,043 107.925 203,397 200,366 
507 690 885 2,952 1,746 
307 1,134 1,257 141,395 24,623 
70,283 55,627 241,046 0 0 
67,550 210,462 210,568 
60,612 71,345 32,659 
53,417 0 928 712 1,303 
40,765 9,717 1,100 0 1,096 
124,454 177,724 43,644 29,369 95,623 
330 0 12,981 154,501 46,207 
1,995 20,057 
103 0 15,846 124,018 460 
37,401 915 307 1,579 
24,012 
55,408 51,923 
449,752 245,025 37,310 
105,160 63,748 
71,952 
127,652 
1,442,071 1,349,410 706,456 657,923 371,424 
23.8 22.3 11.7 10.9 6.1 
See footnote at end of table. 
6 7 
289,011 415,060 
8,491 33,868 
0 0 
13,047 4,569 
310,549 453,497 
5.1 7.4 
I 
SID 8 
47 73,539 
55 
59 422,498 
84 0 
85 
107 
108 
120 
127 
219 
159 
163 
164 
176 
200 
207 
214 
215 
217 
Total 496,037 
8.2 
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APPENDIX D 
(continued) 
EXPENDITURES BY YEAR OF LIF#/ 
9 10 11 
14,128 67,391 10,329 
156,198 
5,121 
175,447 67,391 10,329 
2.9 1.1 .2 
12 13 
8,248 11,997 1, 992,845 
6, 780 
789,771 
372,077 
488,580 
164,616 
56,360 
52,678 
470,814 
231,635 
22,052 
140,427 
40,202 
24,012 
107,331 
732,087 
168,908 
71,952 
127,652 
8,248 11,997 6. 060.779 
.1 .2 100.0 
~/Includes the 19 annexed SID's for which complete data on warrants was 
available by year, from the 80 selected Douglas County SID's for which CAUR coded 
and computerized warrant cost data. 
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APPENDIX E 
INTEREST AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL WARRANT COST 
ANNEXED SID 1 S 
Years of Registered Interest as a Average Length 
Active Warrant Interli~t Percentage of Warrant Life 
SID Life Cost Cost"" of Warrant Cost (in years) 
47 13 $1,775,085 $217,756 12.3 1.0 
55 5 6,504 277 4.3 0.9 
59 9 749,457 40,316 5.4 0.9 
84 9 287,091 84,986 29.6 5.8 
85 3 455,182 33,400 7.3 1.2 
107 3 155,086 9,531 6.1 0.9 
108 5 46,338 9,966 21.5 2.2 
120 5 45,002 7,677 17.1 2.7 
127 5 438,378 32,435 7. 4 1.2 
129 7 211,313 20,321 9.6 1.6 
159 2 21,4 77 577 2.7 0. 7 
163 5 133,007 7,419 5.6 0.9 
164 4 34,691 5,512 15.9 2.1 
176 1 22,720 1,290 5.7 1.0 
200 2 55,983 1,348 2.4 0.4 
207 3 670,686 61,401 9.2 1.4 
214 2 160,960 7 '949 4.9 0.6 
215 1 69,408 2,544 3.7 0.3 
217 1 126,886 765 0.6 0.1 
Total $5,465,254 $545,470 
Average 10.0 
Median 1.0 
a/ 
- Includes interest paid and interest accrued as of June 30, 1974. 
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APPENDIX E 
INTEREST AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL WARRANT COST 
UNANNEXED SID'S 
Length of Interest as a Average Length 
SID Life Warrant Inter~'t Percentage of Warrant Life 
SID (years) Cost Cost- of Warrant Cost (in years) 
31 12 $5. 839. 807 $376,684 6.5 1.1 
45 15 247,347 83,306 33.7 6.2 
62 9 13.369 2,271 17.0 2.6 
69 13 90,463 31,017 34.3 2.4 
75 3 368,205 191,884 52. 1 8.7 
81 7 17,346 9. 534 55.0 3.2 
95 13 4, 725,773 661,763 14.0 2.2 
128 11 131,894 58,436 44.3 2.2 
133 9 89,501 4,969 5.6 0.8 
135 8 172,598 56,426 32.7 4.8 
137 5 117,407 12 '961 11.0 1.4 
143 10 617,411 121,910 19.7 2.6 
151 10 186,217 88,824 47.7 __ E/ 
155 6 96,003 40,535 42.2 4.7 
170 6 40,350 5. 166 12.8 1.7 
172 7 198, 135 41,5 71 21.0 2.2 
179 1 62,624 1, 408 2.2 0.5 
190 8 213,466 20,988 9.8 1.2 
191 3 130,592 11,050 8.5 1.2 
193 5 226,241 52,732 23.3 2.8 
199 3 133,738 7. 997 6.0 0.9 
201 3 38,688 14,000 36.2 
205 5 200,703 4 7. 401 23.6 3.0 
206 6 1,563,181 255,418 16. 3 2.7 
210 6 1,671,651 160,636 9.6 1.7 
220 5 82,619 15,100 18.3 
223 4 237,704 35,546 15.0 1.4 
224 4 2,943,384 468,953 15.9 0.9 
225 4 157,196 29,375 18.7 
227 4 1,662,006 233,828 14.1 
228 4 1,276,989 189,554 14.8 2.1 
See footnotes at end of table. 
~ -«--w,~<- '~~'- ~~"" \1 
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APPENDIX E l I (continued) I 
I 
INTEREST AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL WARRANT COST l 
UN ANNEXED SID'S l 
:h Length of Interest as a Average Length I 
:e SID Life Warrant Inter~~t Percentage of Warrant Life 
SID (years) Cost Cost- of Warrant Cost (in years) 
229 3 - $4,049,559 $388,907 9.6 
232 3 371,936 33,230 8.9 1.5 
233 4 1,249,090 130,238 10.4 1.4 
237 1 '56 ,402 8,958 15.9 
239 3 592,328 41,496 7.0 1.3 
241 3 1,757,662 155 ,086 8.8 
243 3 1,216,916 132,551 10.9 
245 2 259,168 15,953 6.2 
246 2 261,016 11,854 4.5 
247 3 1,501,760 165 ,481 11;0 
249 3 1,170,278 84,644 7.2 
252 3 845,402 44,250 5.2 
254 3 431,006 32,458 7.5 
255 2 150,463 11,701 7.8 
256 2 772,364 48,409 6.3 
257 2 3,237,995 175,560 5.4 1.0 
259 2 103,903 7,692 7.4 
261 2 155,982 5,914 3.8 
262 2 43, 160 2,598 6.0 
263 2 72,280 2,017 2.8 
264 2 1,244,531 60,683 4.9 
266 2 111,469 1,796 1.6 
272 2 646,557 18,292 2.8 
Total $43,85 3, 835 $4,911,011 
Average 11.2 
Median 1.9 
a/ 
- Includes interest paid and interest accrued as of June 30, 1974. 
b/ ' 
- Average length of warrant life not presented because all of the warrants for 
unannexed SID's have not matured. Thus, their average life span cannot be calculated. 
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APPENDIX F 
QUESTIONNAIRE (sample) 
The following is the basic questionnaire used in the CAUR 
study of SID's, with modifications directed toward specific SID 
participants; i.e., contractors, bond house representatives, resi-
dents of SIDs, lawyers and city officials. 
At the request of Senator Cavanaugh's Miscellaneous Subjects 
Commi t.tee, the Center for Applied Urban Research is investigating 
the SID (Sanitary Improvement District) concept as applied in 
Nebraska. We are concerned primarily with whether the SID is a 
proper and effective method of promoting orderly urban development, 
whether changes in the SID law could be made to increase the effec-
tiveness of SID's, and whether alternative methods of urban devel-
opment might be more appropriate. 
As a developer: 
1. What do you see as the primary advantages of the SID concept 
for urban development? 
2. What do you think are the primary disadvantages of the SID? 
3. Do you think any of the following groups have too much or 
too little influence over SID operations? 
A. Developers 
B. City & County Officials 
C. Residents of SID's 
D. Bond houses 
E. Lawyers 
F. Engineers 
G. Architects 
(Probe: What effect does this have on the development process?) 
(take individually) 
4. Of the following groups, rank who benefits (from most to least) 
from the SID concept? Are any hurt by the SID? 
A. Developers 
B. Homeowners 
c. Bond houses 
D. Architects 
E. Engineers 
F. Citizens 
G. Lawyers 
5. Some critics of SID's have claimed there are many opportunities 
for abuse. Has the SID concept been abused in recent years? 
Are there any aspects still open to potential abuse? 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
ts 
ng 
ent, 
fec-
;,1-
? 
Jess?) 
~ast) 
lties 
;? 
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6. What effect have real estate market conditions had upon SID 
operations? 
7. Senator Cavanaugh's bill LB 313 suggests a number of changes 
in the SID law. What will be the impact on SID operations 
from the following amendments: 
A. Requiring warrants to be paid off in three years 
(operation and maintenance) or five years (capital 
outlays)? 
B. Requiring bonds to mature in equal installments 
commencing not more than two years from the date 
of issue? 
C. Permitting SID's to enter into joint projects with 
other SID's? 
D. County approval of recreation projects if not within 
the City's jurisdiction? 
8. How do costs for a project under an SID compare to those in a 
non-SID situation? (higher, lower, same) What types of costs 
(e.g., construction, lawyer fees) are higher or lower in the 
SID concept? 
9. Do you have any guidelines for determining which debt should 
be financed by special assessment and which should be "G.O.'ed"? 
If not, could such guidelines be helpful? What factors do you 
consider in determining which debt should be special assessed? 
10. Have the SID's you have been involved with developed a financial 
plan covering debt, assessment, mill levies? If yes, may we 
have a copy? 
11. What changes would you suggest to make the SID more effective? 
12. Are there any other comments you would like to add? 
MODIFICATIONS 
Additional Questions Asked of Bond House Representatives 
13. What factors do you normally consider when deciding whether 
or not to undertake the marketing of an SID bond issue? 
14. How do you handle the purchase and re-sale of warrants? 
(Directly, through a subsidiary or other procedure.) 
What do you see as the advantages of your procedure over 
alternative procedures? 
~-
1 
15. 
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What basis do you use in establishing your fees and/or discounts 
for: 
A. Purchasing warrants? 
B. Re-selling warrants? 
C. Marketing SID bond issues? 
What are these fees and/or discounts, normally? 
Are these fees and/or discounts different from those you 
charge for selling non-SID bonds, public and/or private, 
and if so how? 
16. What is the role of the bond counsel? 
17. What. factors do yo11 consider when advising SID's about the 
mill levy? 
18. What factors do you consider when advising SID's about G.O. 
vs. special assessment? 
19. What is your opinion about requiring that a prospectus be 
issued on warrants or SID bond purchases? 
Specified Questions Asked of Resident Board of Trustees 
As a resident and member of your SID Board: 
20. What is your opinion of the success of your SID in serving 
the homeowners? 
21. Why did you run for the board of trustees? 
22. Michael Albert, of the Douglas County Board had proposed that 
SIDs notify residents of all SID meetings and that developers 
and realtors who sell property in SIDs inform prospective 
buyers of the SID financial structure, including the district's 
debt and mill levy. What is your opinion about these two 
proposals? 
\ \ 
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